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Abstract 
 The U.S. military has placed a strong focus on the importance of operating in a joint 
environment, where capabilities and missions are shared between service components.  
Protecting U.S. forces is a major consideration in the joint environment.  The Joint Force 
Protection Advanced Security System (JFPASS) architecture has been created to fill a critical 
gap in Joint Force Protection guidance for systems acquisition.  The systems engineering (SE) 
field has made wide use of system architectures to represent complex systems.  As fundamental 
SE principles become more widespread, analysis tools provide an objective method for the 
evaluation of the resulting architectural products.  
 This study used decision analysis to develop a standardized, yet adaptable and repeatable 
model to evaluate the capabilities of the JFPASS for any installation or facility belonging to the 
United States Department of Defense (DoD).  Using the Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) 
methods, a value hierarchy was created by consulting with subject matter experts.  The resulting 
model, named Value-Driven Enterprise Architecture (VDEA) score, provides an analysis tool, 
which enables DoD decision-makers to use JFPASS architecture products to quickly and easily 
evaluate the value provided by the system; VDEA provides insight into the overall quality and 
capability of the system.  Through the scoring and sensitivity analysis functions, capability gaps 
and potential improvements can be identified.  Future studies in this area will provide a vehicle 
for rating not only operational level systems, but also individual functional projects against other 
alternatives. 
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VALUE-DRIVEN ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE EVALUATION  
FOR THE  
JOINT FORCE PROTECTION ADVANCED SECURITY SYSTEM (JFPASS) 
 
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
 The Joint Force Protection Advanced Security System (JFPASS) has been created to 
solve the prominent problem in today’s military of protecting troops in a joint environment.  
There currently is not a comprehensive method to determine both the quality of architectural 
products and of the instantiated system.  The Value-Driven Enterprise Architecture (VDEA) 
evaluation tool was created to fill this critical requirement. 
1.1 General Background 
Force protection has taken a prominent role in today’s environment, following the attacks 
on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the United States military has been deployed in a new 
kind of warfare.  Given the unprecedented warfare tactics (irregular warfare) being employed by 
the enemy, protecting personnel and assets is just as important now as it has ever been.  To 
combat the threats facing the U.S. military, a new emphasis has been placed on joint operations 
in which joint warfighting are essential to the current military culture.  Therefore, the U.S. 
military is seeking to improve the trust and confidence between the separate services and better 
employ their individual core competencies to accomplish the mission of the United States more 
effectively (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 2007; Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2004).  
The new joint environment has created a need for guidance to govern the combined 
operations of the separate services (Office of the CJCS, 2007).  There is only general guidance 
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that dictates the scope and range of each separate service’s responsibilities and individual service 
documents that dictate their specific Concepts of Operations (CONOPS).  However, the 
combined library of guidance documents lacks overarching rules for how joint operations will be 
conducted and how the individual services will proceed in an environment where all operations 
are handled by a mix of service capabilities.  
The systems engineering field has created several tools to represent complex systems, 
such as force protection systems.  An important tool within the Department of Defense is system 
architecture.  System architecture allows the user to represent an extremely complex system 
through a series of “views” which present the system through a number of perspectives.  These 
architectures are used in the acquisition of a system and through its life-cycle to document its 
development.  Judging the quality of the architecture and the systems that it represents, however, 
is a challenge.  Several models have been created to evaluate different aspects of architecture, 
but few focus on the entire portfolio with the instantiated system in mind.  These evaluation tools 
are generally based on the existing system, as opposed to the needs of the decision-maker.  This 
effort combines the Operations Research field, with its Decision Analysis tools, with the 
Enterprise Architecture field and its Architecture Evaluation tools.  Specifically, Value-Focused 
Thinking is used to evaluate Systems Architecture at the intersection of these ideas.  Figure 1.1 
shows a VENN Diagram of the research area. 
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Figure 1.1.  VDEA Venn Diagram 
 
 Value-Focused Thinking is an objective decision analysis approach intended to overcome 
the problem of multicriteria-decision making.  It serves to eliminate assumptions and reveal the 
overarching values at the base of a particular decision.  Using a set methodology such as this 
allows decision-makers to ensure that they are getting the end product that they require and are 
expecting to receive.  Through an established process of identifying objectives; developing 
values, measures, and weights; and then applying functions to these values; a detailed numerical 
analysis can be performed to compare alternatives or to evaluate a single alternative and show 
areas lacking in the important values (Chambal, 2001). 
1.2 Specific Background 
To address growing problems of multi-service coordination within the joint community, a 
system was proposed which would integrate force protection.  The JFPASS project began when a 
Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) was performed for the Joint Force 
Protection Advanced Security System (JFPASS) program (Rains, 2008).  The JCTD is intended 
Operations 
Research
Enterprise 
Architecture
Decision 
Analysis
Value-
Focused 
Thinking
Architecture 
Evaluation 
Tools
VDEA Scorecard
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to demonstrate the integration of various components via a combined command and control 
architecture.  This architecture will encompass the entire range of Joint Force Protection 
functions.  It is based upon the joint operational concepts of Detect, Assess, Warn, Defend and 
Recover (DAWDR) (IUBIP, 2006).   
 The goal of the JFPASS effort is to develop an architecture that will represent the 
JFPASS system and its Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) as required by 
JCIDS (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 2007).  This research effort intends to 
create an evaluation tool to evaluate the enterprise architecture, based on stakeholder values.  All 
aspects of this project are based on the direction given by the IUBIP and centered on the 
DAWDR construct.  Specifically for this effort, the Detect, Assess, and Warn aspects of 
DAWDR are being investigated (Rains, 2008). 
1.3  Research Problem 
There is currently no method to evaluate the effectiveness of a force protection system 
based solely on architectural products.  With the Air Force-wide focus on using architecture as a 
documentation method and a procurement tracking system, an evaluation method is required for 
DoD-specific architectures and specifically in this case for a force protection system architecture. 
1.4  Research Objective and Questions 
This thesis will determine specific Force Protection values and evaluate an existing 
enterprise architecture based on these values.  The JFPASS architecture will be evaluated and an 
analysis returned including critical deficiencies and required improvements.  This research will 
determine an appropriate evaluation method for existing architecture and a way to recommend 
future courses of action based on a set of existing products. 
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The questions this research effort will answer are: (1)  How can VFT be applied to an 
evaluation of a set of architectural products?  (2)  What is the resulting value hierarchy to 
evaluate a force protection system?  (3)  What are the related weights and measures for the 
hierarchy?  (4) How well does the provided architecture score based on this hierarchy and where 
are the shortfalls and potential areas of improvement? 
1.5 Methodology 
Value-Focused Thinking will be applied to architecture to evaluate its viability.  To date, 
VFT has not been used to evaluate an architectural product.  In fact, there is very little research 
on the topic of evaluating architecture and little to no peer-reviewed research regarding the 
analysis of a force protection system.  Leveraging VFT, a methodology for architecture 
evaluation will be developed. 
1.6 Scope 
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the architectural products and the environment 
within which these products were intended to function.  An extendable and defensible tool will 
be created to evaluate a set of static architectural products.  The scope of the force protection 
environment includes worldwide military installations.  It is limited, however, to the realm of 
joint operations.  Therefore, battlespaces controlled by an individual service will not be 
addressed.  For example, portside security will be addressed, but force protection at sea is not 
considered as this is a Navy-specific battlespace.  Space assets will also not be included.  Threats 
from the air will be taken into consideration, but the airspace operating environment will not be 
included.  Since the Air Force maintains primary control over air space engagements (although 
all services operate within this environment), the protection of air assets is not a joint operation.  
Within the force protection area, the Detect, Assess, Warn, Defend Recover (DAWDR) construct 
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will be included in the evaluation, although the Defend and Recover tenets are not of primary 
concern.   
1.7  Review of Chapters/Research Approach 
Chapter 2 consists of a review of the available force protection/facility protection 
material, as well as the DoD guidance governing the individual service’s force protection efforts.  
It discusses how these documents relate to the research effort.  Chapter 3 details the methodology 
used for this effort.  Specifically, it discusses the 10-step VFT process employed here and how 
each step was used to create the resulting hierarchy, assign weights, create Single Dimension 
Value Functions (SDVF), and analyze the model.  It also discusses the collection of relevant 
materials and communication with the decision making entity.  Chapter 4 provides an actual 
evaluation of the architecture in question.  It will show how the instantiated system architecture 
scored on the hierarchy and areas of improvement to produce a fully functional and effective 
force protection system.  Chapter 5 discusses these findings and their applicability to the force 
protection mission.  Chapter 5 also highlights the impact of this effort and details the future 
research required to continue this effort, as well as how it can be applied to other areas. 
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review 
 
 This chapter presents important previous research pertinent to this effort.  Joint force 
protection is presented to provide the context for the overall Joint Force Protection Advanced 
Security System (JFPASS) project.  The field of systems engineering is discussed, as system 
architecture is the tool used to produce the product being examined.  Decision analysis and 
Value-Focused Thinking were used to evaluate the provided architecture.  The basis of the value 
generation step within Value-Focused Thinking was the affinity diagramming method, which is 
taken from the management and planning toolbox.  Finally, net-centricity will be summarized as 
it applies to this project and its impact on the Department of Defense (DoD). 
2.1 Joint Force Protection 
 The term Joint Force Protection (JFP) is used by the DoD to describe efforts related to 
protecting personnel, assets, and information among all service components.  Currently, each 
service has its own tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for accomplishing this goal.  
Recent developments on the political world stage have caused the DoD to move toward a more 
joint environment, as opposed to the separate TTPs formerly used by the services.  This idea is 
outlined in the National Military Strategy, which states that “achieving the objectives of protect, 
prevent, prevail requires connected joint operating concepts (JOCs)” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2004).  Furthermore, Joint Document 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, defines force protection as,  
Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of 
Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical 
information.  Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or 
protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008, p. 214) 
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 The Protection Joint Functional Concept (PJFC) (Department of Defense, 2004) goes on 
to state that the actions involved in force protection (FP) are intended to conserve the force’s 
fighting potential so that it may be applied at the appropriate time to accomplish the mission at 
hand (Department of Defense, 2004).  The U.S. definition also aligns very closely with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition of force protection (NATO Standardization 
Agency, 2008).  This connection allows better communication among multi-national forces. 
 The military’s current method of assessing FP in a facility is through the use of Joint 
Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) teams.  These teams of force protection 
experts visit military installations to determine their level of protection.  As part of this 
assessment, they provide the required training and feedback to enhance protection postures at 
these installations.  The JSIVA program provides a comprehensive assessment tool for 
operational facilities, but they have no method for evaluating FP systems under design (Cirafici, 
2002). 
2.1.1 National Policy 
 Joint force protection concepts are drawn from the national strategic objective.  National 
guidance regarding force protection and military operations come in several tiers.  The National 
Security Strategy (NSS) is the Presidential directive which guides all efforts to secure and defend 
the United States.  It discusses international strategy as well as the United States’ goal of 
improving the quality of life not only within the U.S., but in other countries as well.  It also 
discusses the strategic objective of eliminating terrorism by winning the War on Terrorism 
(Office of the President of the United States of America, 2002).   
 The National Defense Strategy (NDS) directly supports the NSS by establishing 
objectives by which the goals of the NSS will be accomplished and measured.  The NDS 
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provides the link between the DoD and other government agencies as they relate to the security 
objectives of the nation.  The objectives set forth by the NDS are to: (1) secure the United States 
from direct attack, (2) secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action, (3) establish 
security conditions conductive to a favorable international order, and (4) strengthen alliances and 
partnerships to contend with common challenges (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008).  
These objectives provide the direction for the National Military Strategy (Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 2008). 
 The National Military Strategy (NMS) provides the focus for military activities by 
specifying the overall objectives set forth in the NSS and NDS.  To this end, the NMS refers 
specifically to three guiding ideas.  “Protect the United States” refers specifically to what has 
become known as “Homeland Security.”  The NMS establishes homeland security as the first 
priority of the United States.  The armed forces are responsible for securing the nation, both at 
home and abroad.  The military accomplishes missions outside the U.S. to counter threats as they 
occur at their source.  They must then secure strategic approaches to the U.S. to ensure enemy 
forces cannot gain direct access to the country.  Lastly, they must employ force as directed on 
home soil in the case of direct attack.  “Prevent conflict and surprise attack” is the second idea 
specified in the NMS.  This refers mainly to strengthening alliances and creating a security 
environment in which aggressions from adversaries is discouraged.  Preventing this conflict is a 
goal which requires global action and attention to any adversary who may pose a threat to the 
United States.  “Prevail against adversaries” is the objective that refers specifically to the 
military’s mission of swiftly defeating adversaries in campaigns and wars.  This objective 
includes the ability to integrate all available technologies, capabilities, and information in 
overlapping campaigns (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004).   
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 Accomplishing the objectives of protect, prevent, and prevail requires the use of Joint 
Operational Concepts (JOCs).  The NMS focuses largely on the concept of a Joint Service.  The 
desired attributes of a joint force are one that is: fully integrated; expeditionary; networked, 
decentralized, and adaptable; has decision superiority; and is capable of lethality.  The scope of 
security for the joint force is defined in the NMS as: 
the ability to operate across the air, land, sea, space and cyberspace domains of 
the battlespace. Armed Forces must employ military capabilities to ensure 
access to these domains to protect the Nation, forces in the field and U.S. 
global interests. The non-linear nature of the current security environment 
requires multi-layered active and passive measures to counter numerous 
diverse conventional and asymmetric threats. These include conventional 
weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles and WMD/E. They also include threats 
in cyberspace aimed at networks and data critical to U.S. information-enabled 
systems. Such threats require a comprehensive concept of deterrence 
encompassing traditional adversaries, terrorist networks and rogue states able 
to employ any range of capabilities. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004, p. 18) 
By defining joint force security, the National Military Strategy provides the context for joint 
force protection.  It establishes a focus on joint operations and on directing the actions of the 
military.  The NMS implies a need to protect those who are accomplishing the mission.  This 
implication is explored in more depth in the implementation of the objectives set forth in the 
NMS by joint guidance documents. 
2.1.2 Joint Guidance Documents 
 In addition to national policy, several joint documents have been created to help guide the 
development of the joint force.  Each of these documents is targeted toward a specific audience 
for a specific purpose.  There is overlap to each of them, but their guidance is standard across the 
documents.  The recurring theme is that the service components must learn to operate effectively 
in a joint environment.  Each of the following documents gives information critical to operating 
jointly. 
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2.1.2.1 Joint Publication 1 
 Joint Publication 1 (JP1) is the overarching guidance for all other joint publications.  It 
provides the guidance for the unified operations of all branches of service by bridging policy and 
doctrine.  This common perspective is employed by all commanders to ensure that each service 
component is working toward the same goal.  This document directs the services to operate 
jointly by relying on each other’s skills and capabilities.  JP1 states that despite the U.S. 
military’s ability to conduct warfare, the military must also focus on the strategic security 
environment to ensure the viability of its warfighting capability (Office of the CJCS, 2007). 
2.1.2.2 Joint Publication 3-0 
 Joint Publication 3-0 (JP3) extends the guidance in JP1 to include planning and execution 
across the range of military operations typically found in the joint environment.  In JP3, 
protection is included as a critical joint function.  Four primary protection functions are outlined 
as active defensive measures, passive defensive measures, applying technology and procedures, 
and emergency management and response (Office of the CJCS, 2008).  JP3 also extends force 
protection to include friendly nations and other allied organizations.  It also discusses health 
protection as a subsection of FP. 
 JP3 states that the protection function itself includes several tasks.  Each task directly 
relates to the Detect, Assess, Warn, Defend, Recover (DAWDR) construct and concept of 
protecting personnel, assets, and information.  Air, space, and missile defense; protection of 
noncombatants; physical security; antiterrorism; and eight other tasks comprise the protection 
function (Office of the CJCS, 2008).  These protection tasks show the full range of force 
protection. 
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2.1.2.3 Protection Joint Functional Concept 
 The Protection Joint Functional Concept (PJFC) is a DoD governing document regarding 
protection of friendly personnel, information, and assets.  It is intended to guide future joint 
operations within all service components.  The PJFC defines protection as “the ability to sense 
adversary activities, understand their impact on Joint Force operations, and make timely and 
appropriate decision to execute capabilities to neutralize or mitigate adversary effects” 
(Department of Defense, 2004).  This document identifies the three key areas for protection: 
Personnel, Assets, and Information.  They are defined by the protection construct shown in 
Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  The Protection Construct (Department of Defense, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 This construct defines the five key aspects of force protection: Detect, Assess, Warn, 
Defend, and Recover (DAWDR).  The joint force commander must be able to effectively execute 
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each of the DAWDR tenets in a joint environment.  The PJFC also provides the context and 
overall guidance for each of the other Joint Functional Concepts, such as Battlespace Awareness, 
Command and Control, and Force Application.  It also addresses the Mission Capability Areas 
(MCAs) and Mission Capability Elements (MCEs), which are the specific protection tasks which 
enable the joint force to execute its mission (Department of Defense, 2004).  The hierarchy 
described in Figure 2.1 provides the context for joint force protection.  Specifically, it defines the 
scope of joint force protection as falling within the DAWDR construct.  It then specifies 
DAWDR to include personnel, assets, and information, providing a more specific scope for the 
objective of force protection. 
2.1.2.4. Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) 
 The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) provides the standardization required to plan, 
conduct, evaluate, and assess joint and multinational training.  It dictates what specific functions 
must be accomplished by the joint force.  When combined with the Service Task Lists, it 
provides a comprehensive list of tasks and measures for all levels of the DoD.  The UJTL also 
provides the context for interoperability; however, it does not define how services are expected 
to interact with each other in the execution of the joint mission.  The tasks are divided into 
Strategic National, Strategic Theater, Operational, and Tactical tasks.  Each of these tasks 
includes lists of subtasks that fall under the major idea.  Under tactical tasks, subsection six 
focuses specifically on force protection.  The operational context for each task is defined by the 
joint conditions section.  Joint Condition 2.7 is the section which focuses on the protection of 
each area of air, sea, and land.  The most critical part of the UJTL to this study is the definition 
of the measures associated with each protection area.  For example, the measures of Air 
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Superiority are defined as Full, General, Local, or No.  The UTJL, however, only provides broad 
guidance and does not dictate how each service will fulfill its mission (Joint Staff, 2002).   
2.1.3 Service Policies 
 Under the joint guidance, each individual service component must create its own force 
protection guidance to dictate how the principles set forth in joint and national doctrine will be 
accomplished.  Military installations are controlled by the owning service component; however, 
in the case of joint bases or shared installations, a single service is chosen as the lead for force 
protection on that installation.  This presents problems because of the different implementations 
of the joint guidance.  Each service operates within the guidelines set forth, but executes those 
guidelines differently.   
2.1.3.1 Air Force 
 The Air Force’s Installation Security Program (ISP) is their primary guidance for force 
protection.  Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101 provides the implementation of Air Force Policy 
Directive 31-1, Physical Security.  The Air Force places primary responsibility for force 
protection within their Security Forces career field.  This single career field is responsible for 
creating programs and regulations to ensure that the entire population of the installation is 
secure.  Security Forces are responsible not only for the implementation of the Air Force ISP, but 
they are also responsible for ensuring that the installation complies with each level of guidance.  
They must create and maintain an ISP, as well as host the Installation Security Council (ISC) 
(HQ AFSFC/SFON & SFOP, 2003).  A portion of the Air Force force protection responsibility 
falls to the Civil Engineer career field, as they are responsible for designing and building both 
home station and expeditionary structures which must comply with the Anti-Terrorism/Force 
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Protection (ATFP) guidelines as well as the doctrine set forth in joint publications and 
installation-specific regulations. 
2.1.4.2 Army 
 The Army’s physical security program is a component of its force protection program.  
The Army’s program relies on the military police force, but it also makes use of all other soldiers 
to implement the policies and guidance.  For example, physical security inspectors can be from 
any military Occupational Specialty (Department of the Army, 1993).  This policy makes force 
protection a more implicit responsibility.  The regulations within the Army are carried out by 
programs put in place at higher headquarters, but compliance is a command responsibility. 
2.1.3.3 Navy/Marine Corps 
 The Navy and Marine Corps have an entirely different approach to force protection.  
Since they spend the majority of their time at sea, there is a command within the Navy known as 
the Force Protection Command.  Its primary duty is to protect Naval forces from Naval threats.  
The Navy’s port security program is managed either by civilians or their ship security personnel 
(NTTP 3-07.2.1, 2003; NWP 3-07.2 (Rev A), 2004). 
2.1.4 Integrated Unit Base Installation Protection (IUBIP) 
 Integrated Unit Base Installation Protection (IUBIP) has three guiding documents:  the 
IUBIP Concept of Operations (CONOPs), the IUBIP Functional Area Analysis (FAA), and the 
IUBIP Joint Capability Document (JCD).  The IUBIP CONOPs “conceptualizes the integration 
of protection capabilities for agile, decisive, and integrated force employment in all phases of 
combat and supporting operations” (IUBIP, 2006).  The IUBIP FAA defines the tasks required of 
the joint force to accomplish the goal of protecting personnel, information, and assets (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2007).  The IUBIP JCD discusses the Joint Functional Areas, as well as the 
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required capabilities, capability gaps, and threat environment (Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council, 2007).   
 These documents provide the context for the specific project.  The IUBIP CONOPs, 
which builds upon the FAA and JCD, defines the military problem for which the Joint Force 
Protection Advanced Security System (JFPASS) is being created.  Specifically, as the joint force 
is reduced due to budgetary constraints, it will require more efficiency to continue its current 
level of operations.  The IUBIP states that the joint force has a great deal to gain from integration 
and explains how this may be accomplished.  The CONOPs discuss the benefit that net-centricity 
will have on a newer, integrated joint force and how net-centricity is required as the joint force 
matures (IUBIP, 2006).  Net-centricity is typically defined as the operation of a group of nodes 
in communication with each other. 
2.2 Systems Architecture 
 With the complexity of force protection, a system of analysis is required to gain an 
understanding of how the individual services interrelate.  The systems engineering field is an 
interdisciplinary approach to enable the realization of successful systems (Blanchard & 
Fabrycky, 2006).  The creation and design of these systems is accomplished through graphical 
representations, design tools, and process analysis.  Through the use of these tools and system 
analysis, system designers and managers can better understand and therefore manage their 
systems.   
 One of the tools within the systems engineering field that has gained wide use and 
acceptance within the DoD is systems architecture.  The DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
was written as the authoritative source on DoD’s use and implementation of architecture.  The 
DoDAF describes architecture as “the structure of components, their relationships, and the 
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principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution over time” (DoD Architecture 
Framework Working Group, 2007).  Maier and Rechtin (2002) refer to architecture simply as 
“the art and science of designing and building systems.”  The DoDAF prescribes a systematic 
process of architecture by providing the standards by which architecture “views” or products 
(discussed in Section 2.2.1) are created, while Maier and Rechtin (2002) tend to believe that 
architecture is a more abstract concept which requires a “process of insights, vision, intuitions, 
judgment calls, and even taste.” 
2.2.1 DoDAF 
 The DoDAF is the result of at least 12 years of evolution of DoD policy and procedures 
(DoD Architecture Framework Working Group, 2007).  It began with the Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
Architecture Framework v1.0 in 1996 followed by v2.0 in 1997.  The DoDAF v1.0 was 
subsequently released in 2003.  The current version of DoDAF is 1.5 and was released in 2007.  
DoDAF v2.0 has been released in draft form and is being coordinated for an official release 
expected by the middle of 2009.  All of these efforts are the result of the move toward joint and 
multinational operations (DoD Architecture Framework Working Group, 2007).  The DoD has 
ensured the use of DoDAF through the use of policies and directives which require its use in 
acquisition processes.  Table 2.1 displays the evolution of the policy documents that have 
directed the use of DoDAF. 
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Table 2.1.  Federal Policy for Architectures  (DoD Architecture Framework Working 
Group, 2007) 
Policy/Guidance Description 
Clinger-Cohen Act of 
1996 
Recognizes the need for Federal Agencies to improve the 
way they select and manage IT resources and states 
information technology architecture, with respect to an 
executive agency, means an integrated framework for 
evolving or maintaining existing IT and acquiring new IT to 
achieve the agency’s strategic goals and information 
resources management goals”. Chief Information Officers 
are assigned the responsibility for “developing, maintaining, 
and facilitating the implementation of a sound and integrated 
IT architecture for the executive agency.” 
Office of Management and Budget 
Circular A-130 
“Establishes policy for the management of Federal 
information resources” and calls for the use of Enterprise 
Architectures to support capital planning and investment 
control processes. Includes implementation principles and 
guidelines for creating and maintaining Enterprise 
Architectures. 
E-Government Act of 2002 Calls for the development of Enterprise Architecture to aid in 
enhancing the management and promotion of electronic 
government services and processes. 
OMB Federal Enterprise 
Architecture Reference Models 
(FEA RM) 
Facilitates cross-agency analysis and the identification of 
duplicative investments, gaps, and opportunities for 
collaboration within and across Federal Agencies. Alignment 
with the reference models ensures that important elements of 
the FEA are described in a common and consistent way. The 
DoD Enterprise Architecture Reference Models are aligned 
with the FEA RM. 
OMB Enterprise Architecture 
Assessment Framework 
(EAAF) 
Serves as the basis for enterprise architecture maturity 
assessments. Compliance with the EAAF ensures that 
enterprise architectures are advanced and appropriately 
developed to improve the performance of information 
resource management and IT investment decision making. 
General Accounting Office 
Enterprise Architecture 
Management Maturity Framework 
(EAMMF) 
“Outlines the steps toward achieving a stable and mature 
process for managing the development, maintenance, and 
implementation of enterprise architecture.” Using the 
EAMMF allows managers to determine what steps are 
needed for improving architecture management. 
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 There are several types of architecture in systems engineering resources.  DoDAF 
discusses Integrated Architectures, Composite Architectures, and Federated Architectures.  
Integrated architectures are those in which there is concordance between all products and 
entities.  They use a standard nomenclature throughout the operational views (OV), systems and 
services views (SV), all views (AV), and technical views (TV).  In this case, operational views 
are those which describe the general tasks, activities, and major information exchanges.  Systems 
and services views capture specific interconnection information further specifying the 
information found in OVs.  Technical views contain the minimum set of rules which govern the 
functions of the system or system elements.  All-views are the overarching informational views.  
They provide information about the architecture, but do not actually show an architectural view.  
Table 2.2 shows all views included within DoDAF.  Integrated architectures facilitate ease of use 
and communication, as well as aggregation of information.  Composite architectures are those 
composed of separate parts.  Generally, several integrated architectures are pulled together to 
form composite architectures which support a more broad set of goals.  Finally, federated 
architectures are distributed information bases compiling information of use to decision-makers 
at higher levels.  All architectures increase the net-centricity of a system by encouraging the 
process of examining links between nodes and modeling the composition of the system.   
 The DoDAF’s use has become commonplace within several areas of the DoD, 
particularly within the acquisition process.  The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) formally defines the acquisition process and directs the use of certain 
architecture products for milestone decision points (CJCS, 2007).  For example, Milestone 
Decision Point A requires an OV-1 view for consideration of the project (CJCS, 2007). 
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Table 2.2  DoDAF Views (DoD Architecture Framework Working Group, 2007) 
Applicable View Framework 
Product 
Framework Product Name 
All View AV-1 Overview and Summary Information 
All View AV-2 Integrated Dictionary 
Operational OV-1 High-Level Operational Concept Graphic 
Operational OV-2 Operational Node Connectivity Description 
Operational OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix 
Operational OV-4 Organizational Relationships Chart 
Operational OV-5 Operational Activity Model 
Operational OV-6a Operational Rules Model 
Operational OV-6b Operational State Transition Description 
Operational OV-6c Operational Event-Trace Description 
Operational OV-7 Logical Data Model 
Systems and Services SV-1 Systems/Services Interface Description 
Systems and Services SV-2 Systems/Services Communications Description 
Systems and Services SV-3 Systems/Services-Systems/Services Matrix 
Systems and Services SV-4a Systems Functionality Description 
Systems and Services SV-4b Services Functionality Description 
Systems and Services SV-5a Operational Activity to System Function Traceability Matrix 
Systems and Services SV-5b Operational Activity to System Traceability Matrix 
Systems and Services SV-5c Operational Activity to Services Traceability Matrix 
Systems and Services SV-6 Systems/Services Data Exchange Matrix 
Systems and Services SV-7 Systems/Services Performance Parameters Matrix 
Systems and Services SV-8 Systems/Services Evolution Description 
Systems and Services SV-9 Systems/Services Technology Forecast 
Systems and Services SV-10a Systems/Services Rules Model 
Systems and Services SV-10b Systems/Services State Transition Description 
Systems and Services SV-10c Systems/Services Event-Trace Description 
Systems and Services SV-11 Physical Schema 
Technical Standards TV-1 Technical Standards Profile 
Technical Standards TV-2 Technical Standards Forecast 
 
2.2.2 Architecture Evaluation 
 Architecture evaluation has taken many forms from quantitative scoring measures to 
simple heuristics.  It is of great value to not only the model builder, but to the project sponsor as 
well, to be able to determine the quality of a set of architectural products and the associated 
instantiated system.  Since architectures are intended to represent a system, it is important to rate 
not only the architectural products themselves, but also how they accomplish the goal of 
representing the needs of the system itself.   
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 One such evaluation method is Ford’s i-Score (Ford, Graham, Colombi, & Jacques, 
2008), which measures the interoperability of the architecture.  To do so, it uses the DoDAF OV-
5, OV-2, and SV-3.  It is similar to Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) in that it yields a single 
quantitative score that represents how the architecture is performing in terms of interoperability 
(Ford, Graham, Colombi, & Jacques, 2008).  Levis, Shin, and Bienvenu (2000) discusses the 
concept of executable architectures, which relies on modeling and simulation to determine the 
effectiveness of a system.  There have been other tools as well, such as the Architecture Based 
Evaluation Process (Dietrichs, Griffin, Schuettke, & Slocum, 2006) and the Architecture 
Tradeoff Analysis MethodSM (Kazman, Klein, & Clements, 2000), which is intended to evaluate 
software architectures.  Of the architecture evaluation methods in existence, none attempt to 
grade an architecture based on “-illities,” nor do they provide a comprehensive generalized 
approach in line with the stakeholder’s values. 
2.2.3 “Ilities” 
 “Ilities” have grown in popularity across the quality management field.  Particularly in 
the areas of software development and systems engineering, they have become standards for 
describing system attributes.  The INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook version 3.0 defines 
ilities as “the operational and support requirements a program must address (e.g. availability, 
maintainability, vulnerability, reliability, supportability, etc.)” (International Council on Systems 
Engineering, 2007).  Within the systems engineering field, ilities tend to describe the quality 
attributes of a system through their descriptive nature.  This makes ilities useful for describing 
the quality of both the instantiated system as well as the architectural products.  Although a 
single authoritative source for a list of ilities does not exist, they are often created based on the 
quality needs of the system.  Several studies and articles refer to individual use of ilities.  Ross 
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(2006) discusses ilities (flexibility, adaptability, scalability, robustness) which describe the 
“traditional system design concerns.”  McManus et al. (2007) created a quantitative measure for 
describing certain system ilities.  Their work defines and describes six ilities (robustness, 
versatility, changeability, flexibility, scalability, and survivability) which share some of the same 
attributes as other studies.  These studies begin to provide a framework for the evaluation and 
quantification of ilities, although much more work is required in this area.  It is possible to 
“create” ilities by simply adjusting the tense of a system attribute.  A web search yields one list 
of 63 ilities, with many others scattered throughout various sources.  
2.3 Decision Analysis 
 Evaluating the protection status at a United States military installation is currently a very 
subjective process.  Each service has inspection methods in place to ensure compliance with 
regulations and security procedures, but there is no quantitative, objective method for achieving 
this goal.  Inspection procedures consist of checklists that are accomplished by subject matter 
experts appointed by higher headquarters, but their evaluations are still based on their own 
subjective understanding of the regulations.  In addition, these evaluations may not match 
fundamental joint force protection values. 
 The Decision Analysis (DA) field provides decision-makers a set of tools for making 
decisions that are more objective.  In this case, DA provides a quantitative, more objective 
approach to accomplishing the goal of force protection evaluations.  The methods provided 
within the decision analysis discipline give the decision-maker more insight to the problem and 
ensure all data is being examined, thereby facilitating better decisions.  DA is particularly useful 
when several objectives exist and affect different groups of stakeholders.  In the case of 
architecture, a set of products exist, which serve to document a collection of design decisions.  
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Decision analysis provides a tool to evaluate the previously made design decisions as they relate 
to stakeholder values, as well as a method to evaluate decision opportunities. 
 Decision analysis provides a systematic, iterative approach (shown in Figure 2.2) to 
solving a problem (Clemen & Reilly, 2001).  It begins with the most basic step of any analysis, 
to identify the decision situation and understand its objectives.  In this case, the design of a force 
protection system is being evaluated.  The system being designed will be subjected to the 
evaluations of the DoD acquisition process.  The evaluations for system acquisition are largely 
subjective and depend on the opinions of the sponsor and acquisition officer.   
2.4  Value-Focused Thinking 
 Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) is a decision making tool developed by Keeney (1992); it 
enables decision-makers to look beyond the list of available alternatives and focus on the values 
or objectives that are actually important to them in the outcome of the situation.  The VFT 
method is intended to get decision-makers closer to solutions that they actually want (Keeney, 
1992).  In a joint force protection system situation, this facilitates the system sponsors getting the 
product  they need as opposed to choosing between presented alternative systems. 
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Figure 2.2.  Decision-Analysis Process Flowchart (Clemen & Reilly, 2001, p. 6) 
 
2.4.1  Alternative-Focused Thinking versus Value-Focused Thinking 
 The second step of the process shown in Figure 2.2, “Identify Alternatives,” is the issue 
that defines any decision-making problem.  A decision problem generally occurs when a 
decision-maker is presented with at least two alternatives (Keeney, 1992).  They must decide 
among the best of the presented alternatives.  This approach has been called “Alternative-
Focused Thinking” (AFT) since the decision approach is based on choosing from a finite set of 
alternatives.  Because AFT happens after a decision problem has been framed and the solution is 
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chosen from a finite set of alternatives, it is a reactive procedure (Keeney, 1994).  VFT, however, 
is a proactive approach in which decision-makers examine a problem before the decision is 
forced upon them.  It enables the decision-makers to determine what is important to them in 
advance of making the decision and generate alternatives rather than choosing from existing 
alternatives.  This approach also ensures that all possible alternatives are considered instead of 
only a limited set. 
In Alternative-Focused Thinking methodologies, the decision-maker begins the process 
with a set of existing alternatives.  Alternatives though, are only the means to achieve the values 
of the decision-maker in this method.  For this reason, the values should be determined before 
alternatives are created (Keeney, 1994).  The Alternative-Focused Thinking approach leads to 
less understanding of what is important in the end goal.   
 VFT is intended to lead decision-makers to better decisions.  The process set forth in 
previous studies and literature allows for many other advantages as well.  Among these are 
uncovering hidden objectives, guiding information collection, improving collection, facilitating 
involvement in multiple-stakeholder decision, avoiding conflicting decisions, evaluating 
alternatives, creating alternatives, and identifying decision opportunities (Keeney, 1992) 
When VFT is used early enough in a process, many alternatives and opportunities for 
improvement are presented to the decision-maker.  In many cases, a decision situation is forced 
and does not leave decision-makers time to evaluate values and create an exhaustive list of 
alternatives.  Instead, they are presented a finite list of alternatives and must choose the best of 
those available.  By applying VFT early, it is possible to guide information collection and 
identify decision opportunities prior to the decision situation.  During the design phase of an 
acquisition project, there are several opportunities for improvement over the long process.  
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Focusing on values throughout the entire process will allow the designer to achieve a more 
robust and useful product for the sponsor, instead of simply fulfilling the requirements.  
Kirkwood (1997) discusses several of the same advantages, including that the VFT process is 
helpful in facilitating communications between stakeholders.  VFT seeks to create a hierarchical 
representation of what is important to the decision-maker.  This hierarchy includes tiers of value, 
which become more specific as the tiers progress.  The value hierarchy gives stakeholders a 
common frame of reference for what is important in the project and gives all stakeholders input 
into the importance of each value.  In projects with a large number of objects, complex issues, 
and many stakeholders, communication is essential to achieving the objectives of the project.   
2.4.2 Discussion of Value 
 Throughout the literature regarding Value-Focused Thinking and Decision Analysis, the 
terms “Value” and “Objective” are often used interchangeably.  “Values are what we care about” 
(Keeney, 1992).  They are the fundamental part of any decision that dictates in what the 
decision-maker is truly interested.  Keeney (1992) uses two distinct terms, value and objective, 
when discussing what is important.  The term “value” refers to an idea that the decision-maker is 
trying to describe.  The term “objective” is typically used to describe the evaluation measure of 
the value included in the hierarchy.  Kirkwood (1997) defines the connection between a value 
and an objective by his definition of the term “objective.”  He defines it as “the preferred 
direction of movement with respect to an evaluation consideration.”  Several previous research 
efforts have used either term to describe the actual elements of the hierarchy.  Shoviak (2001) 
uses the term “objective” almost exclusively, while Katzer (2002) uses “value” in the same way, 
in the same contexts.  An examination of several other VFT-focused research efforts has yielded 
similar differences in the use of the terms.  Clemen and Reilly’s (2001) discussion of objectives 
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and values distinguishes the two terms based on their relation to the user.  They refer to value as 
anything that matters to the decision-maker.  Objectives are defined as the specific things that the 
decision-maker wants to achieve.  Based on these definitions, the combination of the objectives 
gives the decision-maker their overall values.  The objectives are the specific things that will 
influence the final decision and the values are characteristics of the preferred outcome. 
2.4.3 Value-Focused Thinking Methodology 
 VFT was initially laid out by Keeney (1992) and refined by Kirkwood (1997).  Over the 
years, this methodology has been applied and adapted for several purposes.  Keeney (1992) 
discussed three “situation based” five-step processes.  These processes refer to situations in 
which a decision problem or decision opportunity exists.  The decision opportunities are then 
broken down into two processes.  One for a situation before strategic objectives have been 
specified and one for situations after strategic objectives have been specified.  Each of these 
situations have a five step process for completing the VFT process.  These processes, in 
combination with Kirkwood (1996) can be extended to a ten-step process (Chambal, 2001).  The 
ten-step process expands on Keeney’s by adding individual steps for measures, value functions, 
and hierarchy as well as expanding the analysis of the VFT process by including Kirkwood’s 
methods.  These methods are shown in Table 2.3.      
As demonstrated by the selected methodologies in Table 2.3, there are several different 
ways to apply Value-Focused Thinking to a decision.  Each of the steps laid out in these 
processes share some similar features, which can be combined into a single, ten-step process, 
accounting for all major activities and milestones.  The ten-step version guides the evaluator 
through the Keeney and Kirkwood methodologies in a straightforward fashion, ensuring that 
each iterative step accomplishes the necessary activities.  The ten-step process effectively 
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combines the previous methodologies and accounts for all of their ideas.  This process has been 
refined and applied in several research projects. These projects include an examination of 
advanced academic degree profiles (Gentil, 2007), a Force Protection Battlelab project 
evaluation initiative (Jurk, 2002), and strategic airlift (Tharaldson, 2006).  Chambal’s (2008) 
process follows a path of distinct activities, separating Value Hierarchy creation, Measure 
Creation, Weighting, Scoring, and Analysis in a unique way.  Figure 2.3 shows a graphical 
representation of the ten-step process.  In the following pages, the VFT process will be discussed 
in depth. 
 
Table 2.3.  VFT Methodologies (Keeney, 1992; Kirkwood, 1997; Chambal, 2001) 
 
 
Author Keeney Keeney Keeney Kirkwood 10-Step Process
Situation Decision Problems Decision Opportunities before 
specifying objectives
Decision Opportunities after 
specifying objectives
All All
Recognize a decision problem Indentify a decision opportunity Specify Values Identify Decision Problem Identification
Specify Values Specify Values Create a Decision Opportunity Structure Objectives Create Value Hierarchy
Create Alternatives Create Alternatives Create Alternatives Develop Evaluation Measures Develop Evaluation Measures
Evaluate Alternatives Evaluate Alternatives Evaluate Alternatives Develop Alternatives Create Value Functions
Select an Alternative Select an Alternative Select an Alternative Determine Single Dimensional Value 
Function
Weight Hierarchy
Develop Weights Alternative Generation
Determine Overall Values for 
Alternatives
Alternative Scoring
Select Alternative Deterministic Analysis
Sensitivity Analysis
Recommendations Presentation
Steps
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 Parnell describes three “levels” of VFT models as the Silver, Gold, and Platinum 
standards (Parnell, 2007).  These standards are used throughout the process as methods of 
communicating and building the model.  The framework decided upon is descriptive of how the 
process is completed.  Several aspects of the VFT process are impacted, such as how the 
hierarchy is built, description of the problem, construction of measures, and perhaps of most 
importance, the development of value weights.  The Silver standard is the least preferable of the 
standards (Dawley, Marentette, & Long, 2008).  It incorporates the opinions of a large number of 
stakeholders and uses various idea-generation techniques to determine inductively the values of 
the organization (Chambal, 2001).  The Gold standard bases the model construction on existing 
documents and guidance.  Through an examination of documents, such as vision statements, 
Step 1:  Problem 
Identification
2.4.3.1
Literature 
Review
LEGEND
Step 2:  Create Value 
Hierarchy
2.4.3.2
Step 3:  Develop 
Evaluation Measures
2.4.3.3
Step 4:  Create Value 
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2.4.3.4
Step 5:  Value 
Hierarchy Weights 
2.4.3.5
Step 6:  Alternative 
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2.4.3.6
Step 7:  Alternative 
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2.4.3.7
Decision-
maker 
Interviews
Decision 
Model
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Step 8:  Deterministic 
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2.4.3.8
Step 9:  Sensitivity 
Analysis
2.4.3.9
Step 10:  Recommendations 
Presentation
2.4.3.10
-Primary Inputs
-Major Steps
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maker and 
Subject Matter 
Expert 
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Figure 2.3.  Ten-Step Process Graphical Representation (Chambal, 2001)
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mission statements, rules, regulations, etc., the model builder is able to gain an appreciation for 
what is important to the organization, which allows deductive development of the model.  The 
organization’s senior leaders must then validate gold standard models (Chambal, 2001).  
Through examinations of documentation as well as validation, this standard is most easily 
defendable (Jurk, 2002).  The Gold standard also allows the model builder to create a 
“strawman” hierarchy from which to begin and base discussion.  Strawman hierarchies tend to 
facilitate discussions with the decision-maker and make effective and efficient use of time 
(Katzer, 2002).  Finally, the Platinum standard relies on interviews regarding the values of the 
key decision-maker as well as technical experts and stakeholders.  This method gives not only 
the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) buy-in to the hierarchy, but also facilitates direct involvement 
of the final decision authority.  The platinum standard often begins with an examination of 
strategic objectives, organizational plans, and visions (Chambal, 2001), but moves on to capture 
the values of the final decision-maker.  This final decision authority’s opinions and views on the 
system lead to a more accurate depiction of what is important in the model.  These models tend 
to capture most accurately the intended hierarchy structure due to the direct involvement of the 
stakeholders and final decision authority (Braziel, 2004). 
2.4.3.1 Step 1 – Problem Identification 
 Problem identification is the cornerstone of any scientific process and is consistently 
referenced as the first step to solving problems.  In many cases, an undesirable solution to a 
problem is based on a decision-maker’s failure to identify and understand the problem itself.  In 
addition to the model builders and decision-maker understanding the objectives of the process, 
all stakeholders should have a clear understanding of the goal.  Everyone involved in the process 
must have a common idea of the problem itself, so that wasted effort can be avoided. 
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2.4.3.2 Step 2 – Create Value Hierarchy 
 A value hierarchy is a graphical representation of the values or objectives most essential 
to the decision-maker.  Keeney (1994) defines values as “Principles for evaluating the 
desirability of any possible alternatives or consequences.”  The hierarchical structure allows the 
model builder to represent values from a top-down perspective, showing not only what the 
overarching value is, but also going into the level of detail required for the problem.  The 
resulting hierarchy must be defendable.  A defendable architecture must agree with the decision-
maker’s objectives as well as the organizational goals.  This must also be done within the 
constraints of the methodology chosen. 
2.4.3.2.1 – Generating Values 
 The generation of values depends greatly on the standard chosen for the model being 
constructed.  The actual process of finding these values can be quite different depending on the 
choice between the “silver,” “gold,” or “platinum” standard.  The values may come directly from 
an examination of documentation or from interviews with various personnel and ultimately a 
validation by some level of decision-making authority.  If possible, the highest-level decision-
maker should be chosen (Keeney, 1994).   
 Keeney (1994) distinguishes between two different types of objectives or values.  He 
refers to fundamental objectives as “[objectives that] concern the ends that decision-makers 
value in a specific decision context” and means objectives as “methods to achieve ends.”  Means 
objectives serve as way to identify fundamental objectives.  The means objectives can be 
quantified by continually asking the question “Why is that important?” until a fundamental 
objective is reached (Keeney, 1994).  Fundamental objectives can also be called “ends 
objectives” (Kirkwood, 1997). 
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Developing the list of values can be accomplished through a number of techniques.  
These techniques include: develop a wish list; identify alternatives; consider problems and 
shortcomings; predict consequences; identify goals, constraints, and guidelines; consider 
different perspectives; determine strategic objectives; determine generic objectives; structure 
objectives; and quantify objectives (Keeney, 1994).  Using Keeney’s (1994) suggested 
techniques, one will develop a list of items including fundamental objectives and means 
objectives.  This list must then be examined to determine what each of the list items are, thereby 
eliminating items that are not values.  The goal of this process is to end with a list of 
“collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive” objectives (Kirkwood, 1997).  These objectives 
should be characterized by three features: a decision context, an object, and a direction of 
preference.   
2.4.3.2.2 – Structuring Values 
 Once values have been determined, they must be placed into a readable, understandable, 
graphical structure.  This structure allows for easy communication to a wider range of users.  
Keeney (1992) notes that prior to his work, there had not been a standard format for structuring 
values.  He therefore proposes the hierarchical method of structuring (Keeney, 1992).  Kirkwood 
(1997) defines a value hierarchy as “a value structure with a hierarchical or “treelike” structure.”  
This process is also known as a “top-down” structure, as it is based on the fundamental value. 
 The basic nature of hierarchies is both vertical and horizontal.  As demonstrated in Figure 
2.4, the hierarchy is made up of both tiers and branches.  Tiers are the layers or levels that, 
collectively, specify the values on the tier above.  Branches are the values that actually specify 
the value above.  Within each branch, the values in each progressively lower tier specify a single 
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value from the above tier of the same branch.  The breadth of the hierarchy is defined by the 
number of branches and the depth is defined by the number of tiers. 
 
 
Figure 2.4.  Example Hierarchy  (Chambal, 2001) 
 
 Keeney’s (1992) method involves three basic steps: placing the overall fundamental 
value at the top of the hierarchy, relating values on different levels, and stopping the structuring 
process.  In this process, the overall value is the reason for the decision and defines the breadth 
of the decision problem.  Choosing this overall value is therefore very important.  For some 
decisions, it is easy to identify, but ensuring that it is the correct value will affect the entire 
process.  Following the selection of a fundamental value, other values must be placed below it in 
the proper branch and tier based on their relation to the fundamental value (Keeney, 1992; 
Kirkwood, 1997).  Each progressively lower tier specifies the values above it.  In Tier 2 of 
Figure 2.5, Values 1 and 2 further define the value found in Value 1 of Tier 1.  The combination 
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of the two lower values makes up the higher value.  The critical part of Keeney’s (1992) process 
is stopping the structuring process.  The “test of importance” is the first determination as to how 
many values should be included.  The size of the hierarchy must be balanced with the detail 
necessary to capture the values.  Each value must also be measurable by an attribute (Keeney, 
1992).  The model builder should continue moving down the hierarchy, progressively refining 
the values within each branch by adding more tiers, until the model builder no longer must ask 
“What do you mean by that?” (Katzer, 2002).  Moving up the hierarchy within a branch answers 
the question, “of what more general objective is this an aspect?” (Katzer, 2002).  When building 
the value hierarchy, if a value cannot be decomposed into more than one lower tier value, it 
should not be decomposed.  As the number of tiers within a hierarchy increases, its size increases 
vertically.   
2.4.3.2.3 – Desirable Properties of a Value Hierarchy 
 Kirkwood (1997) presents five properties that are desirable for any value hierarchy.  
These properties include completeness, nonredundancy, decomposability, operability, and small 
size.  Completeness is considered one of the most important properties for a hierarchy to exhibit.  
Another way of describing completeness is if a hierarchy is “collectively exhaustive.”  It stands 
to reason that any hierarchy must contain all of the values important to the decision-maker.  This 
includes any value that is required to evaluate the fundamental objective.  For a hierarchy to 
show completeness, it must be possible to evaluate the objective based only on the values 
presented in the hierarchy.  If there are other considerations required for evaluation, they must be 
added to the hierarchy.  This includes all values, no matter how small of a part they may play in 
the final evaluation.  Their magnitude of importance is considered during the weighting phase of 
the evaluation (Kirkwood, 1997).   
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There may also exist values that appear to be more basic to the problem than evaluation 
criterion.  These values may be “promoted” to “screening criteria.”  Screening criteria will be 
discussed in more depth in Section 2.4.3.6 - Alternative Generation.  Determining the difference 
between values and screening criteria may be difficult.  Screening criteria should be used for the 
sole purpose of reducing the number of alternatives (Kirkwood, 1997).  For example, a value 
may be “Distance” while a screening criteria would be “Less than five miles away.”  The 
distance value simply states that the relative distance is important in the end decision.  The 
screening criteria “Less than five miles away” specifically eliminates certain alternatives based 
on their distance (Kirkwood, 1997).  Each value must also pass a “test of importance.”  The 
decision-maker must ask whether the inclusion of a specific value will alter the outcome of the 
decision problem.  If the decision-maker feels that the exclusion of a specific value could alter 
the best course of action, then it must be included.  If the exclusion of a value will have no effect 
on the outcome, then it can be left out of the hierarchy.  The major caution with this “test of 
importance” is the possible exclusion of a collection of independently unimportant values, but 
which serve a major part in the decision when considered together.  The collective importance of 
any excluded values must be continually evaluated; therefore, the excluded values should not be 
completely discarded, so that future iterative evaluations may be completed on them.  By 
conducting the test of importance at different stages in the process and with the obvious 
groupings of these values, it is possible to ensure that none of the excluded values will have a 
major effect on the final decision (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). 
Nonredundancy is another very important property of a value hierarchy.  Nonredundancy 
is also referred to as “mutually exclusivity”  (Kirkwood, 1997).  A hierarchy is considered 
mutually exclusive if no two values in the same tier overlap in any way.  Every aspect of the 
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evaluation criteria must relate to one and only one value.  Each tier of the hierarchy should 
divide the tier above, lower levels essentially composing the values above them.  The property of 
nonredundancy ensures that no value is double-counted and therefore receives more weight than 
it deserves.  Based on these first two properties, every hierarchy at its very base must be 
“collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive.”  These are possibly the two most important 
properties, since they ensure that everything is included and that all values required are 
represented only once in the hierarchy.   
Decomposability or independence refers to a value’s influence on other values 
(Kirkwood, 1997).  The actual scoring of any value cannot have any influence on the scoring of 
another value.  Decomposability ensures that there is not only a measurement for each value, but 
that the measurements themselves are also mutually exclusive.  This separation of measurement 
ensures that the weighting of each value may be completed (Shoviak, 2001).   
An operable hierarchy refers more to the utility of the tool itself.  Any value hierarchy 
must be understandable, at a minimum to those who must use it in an evaluation (Kirkwood, 
1997).  This is a rather subjective property, but in communicating a hierarchy or decision 
analysis tool, the users must be able to understand quickly and easily the points that the model 
builder is trying to get across.  The more technical the subject matter, the more difficult it will be 
to satisfy this property, although the subject matter itself does not necessarily have to have an 
effect on the understandability of the hierarchy itself.  If the reader is able to understand the tool, 
then it is considered operable. 
The last desirable characteristic of a value hierarchy is small size.  In comparison, a 
smaller hierarchy is generally preferable to a larger one (Kirkwood, 1997).  The key tradeoff is 
that it must also be collectively exhaustive.  Therefore, the small size property is directly dictated 
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by the minimum amount of information necessary to properly evaluate the decision problem.  
Small size also has an influence on the operability of the hierarchy.  Larger hierarchies are 
generally more difficult to communicate to stakeholders than a compact hierarchy.  The size also 
becomes an issue in the employment and analysis of the tool.  A larger, more complex tool will 
be not only more difficult to use, but more difficult to evaluate.   
The size issue must be considered in two dimensions.  The nature of hierarchies is both 
horizontal and vertical.  Therefore, the model builder must be sure to include not only the 
necessary breadth, but depth as well.  Breadth of the model is determined by the number of 
values to which the fundamental value can be decomposed.  As the level of tiers increases, the 
number of values generally increases exponentially.  Therefore, an increase in depth has a direct 
effect on the breadth of the hierarchy.  To keep these two issues under control, the “test of 
importance” and guidance by the model builder must be used to ensure that each tier and value 
are directly influential to the fundamental value. 
2.4.3.3 Step 3 - Develop Evaluation Measures 
 Evaluation measures or attributes exist for determining how well an alternative performs 
with respect to a particular value.  This can be accomplished qualitatively or quantitatively, but 
each lowest-tier value must be measurable.  The evaluation measures should provide the 
mechanism for turning a subjective decision into an objective decision (Kirkwood, 1997).  
Graphically, the measures appear below the lowest level of decomposition in the value hierarchy.  
The model builder should use as many measures as necessary to properly quantify the attributes 
of the value. 
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2.4.3.3.1 – Types of Evaluation Measures 
 Evaluation measures may be classified as either natural or constructed and direct or 
proxy.  The type of measure depends upon the availability of data regarding the value as well as 
whether the measure is qualitative or quantitative.  A natural scale is one with a common 
interpretation to any audience.  Constructed scales are developed specifically for measuring the 
value (Kirkwood, 1997).  Generally, constructed scales are used when no natural scale is evident 
or they may also be used when there is not enough data to measure the value exactly (Kirkwood, 
1997).   
 In addition to being either natural or constructed, a measure will also be either direct or 
proxy.  Direct scales measure the degree of attainment of the value explicitly.  A proxy measure 
still measures the value, but does so indirectly.  Proxy measurement may use some other piece of 
data or a collection of data that represents the degree of attainment of the value.  It is possible for 
any measure to be categorized as any combination of natural/constructed and direct/proxy 
(Kirkwood, 1997).  A Natural-Direct measure is the most preferable, as it measures the value 
most accurately.  Natural-Proxy and Constructed-Direct are next in terms of desirability, and a 
Constructed-Proxy scale is the least desirable since it requires interpolation between the measure 
and the value (Table 2.4) (Dawley, Marentette, & Long, 2008). 
2.4.3.3.2 – Desirable Properties of Evaluation Measures 
 Just as with values, several properties are desirable for evaluation measures.  In the case 
of the measures, model builders should consider measurability, operationality, and 
understandability.  Measurability “defines the associated value in more detail than that provided 
by the value alone” (Keeney, 1992).  Each measure must define the value as intended by the 
decision-maker.  Operationality refers to a measure’s ability to “express relative preferences for 
39 
 
different levels of achievement of an objective” (Keeney, 1992).  Finally, a measure is 
considered understandable if any audience can easily understand its purpose as was originally 
intended by the model builder.   
2.4.3.4 Step 4 – Value Function Creation 
 Value functions exist for the purpose of converting the measurement of an objective into 
value units.  Converting the measurements into value solves the problem of the values being 
measured with different scales and different units.  A Single Dimension Value Function (SDVF) 
plots the measurement of the value (x-axis) versus a related value unit from zero to one (y-axis) 
(Kirkwood, 1997).  The least preferred score of a measurement will relate to zero, while the best 
possible score earns a full value of one.  An alternative’s degree of attainment of the value in 
question will be plotted on the x-axis of the measure.  SDVFs are built using inputs from the 
decision-makers, stakeholders, or available data on the values.  
 SDVFs are defined by their shape and monotonicity; they may also be either continuous 
or discrete.  Continuous SDVFs are either monotonically increasing or monotonically 
decreasing.  Figure 2.5 is an example of a linear, monotonically increasing SDVF, meaning that 
the difference in value between 10 and 20 on the x-axis is the same as the difference between 70 
and 80.  Figures 2.6 and 2.7 are examples of exponential monotonically increasing SDVFs.  In 
the case of Figure 2.6, the difference in value between 10 and 20 on the x-axis is considerably 
smaller than the difference between 70 and 80.  This is referred to as a “convex” exponential 
curve.  Figure 2.7 is referred to as “concave,” and exhibits similar properties as a concave SDVF. 
Therefore, in this case, as more of the score is attained, the value gained gets smaller (more value 
is earned early), whereas in Figure 2.6, as more of the score is attained, the value gets 
exponentially larger (Kirkwood, 1997).  Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 are all examples of 
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monotonically decreasing SDVFs; measure 5 is a linear decreasing SDVF while measures 5 and 
6 are exponentially decreasing SDVFs.   (Kirkwood, 1997).  The decreasing SDVFs are 
interpreted the same way as increasing SDVFs. 
 Figure 2.11 is an example of a piecewise linear SDVF.  Piecewise linear curves may also 
be monotonically increasing or decreasing.  They are composed of multiple linear sections that 
are broken by inflection points.  In the example measure, value is earned more quickly between 
x-axis values of 25 to 70, value is earned more slowly when the x-axis values are smaller than 25 
or greater than 70 (Kirkwood, 1997).   
 Figures 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15 are examples of “S-Curve” SDVFs.  “S-Curve” SDVFs 
are a type of exponential curve which may also be either monotonically increasing or decreasing, 
but take on the properties of a piecewise curve while retaining the exponential shape.  The four 
example measures shown are the four possible general configurations of S-Curves.  They 
account for both monotonically increasing and decreasing curves as well as concave and convex 
shapes. 
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       Figure 2.5.  Monotonically Increasing               Figure 2.6.  Monotonically Increasing 
 
 
       Figure 2.7.  Monotonically Increasing            Figure 2.8.  Monotonically Decreasing 
 
 
 
      Figure 2.9.  Monotonically Decreasing            Figure 2.10.  Monotonically Decreasing 
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             Figure 2.11 – Piecewise Linear                      Figure 2.12.  Monotonically Increasing 
 
 
       Figure 2.13.  Monotonically Increasing              Figure 2.14.  Monotonically Decreasing 
 
 
 
       Figure 2.15.  Monotonically Decreasing                           Figure 2.16.  Discrete 
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 The final possible type of SDVF is discrete.  In this style of value function, the possible 
scores are grouped into categories or bins.  The value, therefore, increases incrementally to 
account for the changes in categories.  This type of SDVF is particularly useful for qualitative or 
binary measures.  The categories must be well defined so that there is no question as to which 
category an alternative belongs.  Figure 2.16 shows an example of a discrete measure.  
2.4.3.5 Step 5 – Value Hierarchy Weights 
 With the value hierarchy and SDVFs created, the decision-maker has a solid frame of 
reference for what is important, as well as a basis for the values implicit in the decision.  Each 
value must then be weighted to show its relative importance to the decision-maker.  There are 
two primary methods for determining the weight of each value, the direct weighting method and 
the swing weighting method.  Both of the methods give rise to local weights and global weights 
(Shoviak, 2001). 
 Local weight refers to the relative importance of a single value in relation to other values 
in the same branch and tier.  Therefore, the values in each branch and tier must sum to one.  In 
the case of Figure 2.5, all values in Tier 1 must total 1.  Therefore, Tier 1 Value 1 may have a 
weight of 0.6, while Tier 1 Value 2 has a weight of 0.3 and Tier 1 Value 3 has a weight of 0.1.  
This means that Tier 1 Value 1 is twice as important as Tier 1 Value 2, and Tier 1 Value 2 is 3 
times as important as Tier 1 Value 3.  This method is applied to each tier and branch of the 
hierarchy.  Therefore, the weight of Tier 2 Value 1 and Tier 2 Value 2 must also sum to 1 to 
make up the total value of Tier 1 Value 1.  Measures are also weighted in the same way.  As the 
process moves, the model builder and decision-maker may weight the hierarchy moving from the 
lowest tier to the highest or from the highest to the lowest. 
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One method for leading the decision-maker to a conclusion of the weights is the use of 
the “100 Coin” method (Jurk, 2002).  In this situation, the decision-maker is asked to distribute 
100 “coins” between the values; i.e. if the decision-maker had 100 coins to distribute between 
the different values, where would they be placed?  In this method, the number of “coins” placed 
on any value becomes the percentage of importance or the percentage of emphasis placed on one 
value when compared to others in the same tier and branch.  Decision-makers may also be asked 
to rate each value relative to the others.  For example, the decision-maker may say that “Tier 1 
Value 1 is twice as important as Tier 1 Value 2 and Tier 1 Value 2 is 3 times as important as Tier 
1 Value 3.”  In this case, the weights become 0.6, 0.3, and 0.1, respectively.  Ratios may also be 
used to determine the weights. 
Local weights determine the relative importance of values in relation to the other values 
on the same tier, but values must also be rated in terms of “Global” importance.  These weights 
are referred to as “Global Weights.”  The global weight may be found through direct weighting 
or it may be found after local weighting by their multiplicative functions in relation to the overall 
fundamental value in the hierarchy.  Global weights must sum to 1 across an entire tier as 
opposed to local weights, whose sum must be one for a tier in any given branch.  Consider a case 
in which Tier 2 Value 1’s local weight is 0.75 and Tier 2 Value 2’s local weight is 0.25 locally.  
In this case, the weights are multiplied up the hierarchy to determine their global importance.  If 
Tier 1 Value 1’s weight is 0.6, then the global weights for Tier 2 Value 1 and Tier 2 Value 2 
become 0.45 (x = 0.75*0.6) and 0.15 (x = 0.25*0.6), respectively.  Figure 2.17 shows the 
example hierarchy with local weights displayed and Figure 2.18 shows the hierarchy with global 
weights displayed.  As is evident here, all values in a tier total 1 and the measures are then 
weighted according to the value that they measure. 
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Figure 2.17.  Example Hierarchy with Local Weights 
 
Figure 2.18.  Example Hierarchy with Global Weights 
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 Another method of weighting a hierarchy is known as “Swing Weighting.”  This method 
is a local weighting technique and was compiled from procedures set forth by Chambal (2008) 
and Kirkwood (1997).  This technique examines the possible outcomes that may be reached 
based on the weights of the values.  The decision-maker is asked to examine each tier of values 
and determine the change in increments of value that would be reached by varying the weight of 
each value from its least preferred state to its most preferred state.  These increments are then 
placed in increasing order and assigned a factor of importance in relation to the smallest value.  
These increments, which should sum to one, are then solved as a system of equations to 
determine the local weight within the given tier (Jurk, 2002). 
2.4.3.6 Step 6 – Alternative Generation 
 One of the advantages of using VFT is the ability to generate alternatives as opposed to 
simply choosing from given alternatives.  Once the hierarchy has been weighted, this is possible.  
In the initial stages of alternative generation, experience gained by simply creating the hierarchy 
will often yield a great number of possible alternatives.  Building the hierarchy often gives the 
decision-maker new ideas and insights into the importance of the outcome and new ideas for 
alternatives.  “Either the alternatives are somewhere in the mind waiting to be found, or they can 
be created from what is in the mind” (Keeney, 1992, p. 198). 
 If too many alternatives are found, the list must be reduced to a manageable number.  In 
this case, additional screening criteria may be added to eliminate some of the less desirable 
options.  Screening criteria are based on values that serve to eliminate some alternatives prior to 
scoring.  A screening criteria may be established if some alternative scores zero on a particular 
measure.  Screening criteria may also be something that is required by the decision-maker; i.e., if 
some value or condition is not true, the alternative is eliminated completely from consideration.  
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Some values may be so important that an alternative will not be considered without their 
inclusion.  Alternatives may also be eliminated based on known values.  If there are not enough 
alternatives, this usually suggests a gap in the value hierarchy, i.e., there is something important 
which is not being considered and that would give the decision-maker more alternatives.  
Strategy generation tables may also be used to generate alternatives (Kirkwood, 1997).  The most 
important thing to remember during this process is that the alternatives must satisfy the values in 
the hierarchy.  In some cases, alternative generation may not be necessary if the field of 
alternatives is given or if some outside factor limits the alternatives.   
2.4.3.7 Step 7 – Alternative Scoring 
 Following alternative generation, each alternative must be individually scored.  Data is 
collected regarding each alternative and its attainment of each lowest-tier value (based on the 
measures of those values).  Scores are then assigned to each measure within each alternative.  
During this process, the y-axis or value units are hidden from the scorers, so that the value does 
not impact the scoring of the alternatives.  Each score must be well documented, clearly defined, 
and repeatable by anyone who scores the alternative. 
2.4.3.8 Step 8 – Deterministic Analysis 
 The deterministic analysis step combines all data collected to this point.  Through the use 
of an additive value function, the scores given to each alternative (step 7) are converted to value 
units (step 4), and then multiplied by their weights (step 5) to yield a single aggregate score.  The 
additive value function is the way in which the decision-maker may perform detailed analysis of 
the alternatives (Shoviak, 2001).  The general additive value is described in equation 2.1 
(Kirkwood, 1997): 
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                                                       (2.1) 
Where v(x) is the overall score of the alternative,  is the value of the score on the ith 
measure,  weight of the ith measure, n is the total number of measure, and the sum or all  
must equal one. 
2.4.3.9 Step 9 – Sensitivity Analysis 
 Sensitivity analysis is performed on the hierarchy to provide additional insight into the 
weighting of the values and how they affect the scores of the alternatives.  Typically, sensitivity 
analysis is performed on the higher tiers of the hierarchy, since altering the weights of values on 
lower tiers will have less effect on the total score.  Sensitivity analysis is performed by 
systematically altering the weight (local or global) of one value, while keeping the other weights 
on that tier proportional.  The weights must continue to sum to one across a tier.  Sensitivity 
analysis serves to answer the question, “How would this decision change if another interested 
party had weighted the hierarchy or provided data for the SDVFs?” (Katzer, 2002, p. 46). 
2.4.3.10 Step 10 – Recommendations Presentation 
 The final step in the process requires the model builder to present recommendations to 
the decision-maker.  Parnell suggests that one-third of decision analysis efforts should be placed 
in the recommendations presentation.  The recommendations must be easy to understand for all 
audiences.  They must also explain the decision made and why it was made.  It is important to 
remember that the final decision still lies in the hands of the final decision authority.  The VFT 
process serves to assist the decision-making process and provide objective data and an analysis 
of alternatives.  There may be cases where the recommended alternative may not be chosen. 
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2.5.  Management and Planning Tools 
As a part of the value determination process, it may be necessary to organize information 
found during the document review phase.  Several tools exist for managing ideas and concepts.  
Tague (2004) identified seven management and planning tools; these consist of affinity 
diagrams, interrelationship diagrams, tree diagrams, prioritization matrices, matrix diagrams, 
process decision program charts, and activity network diagrams.  These tools were organized in 
1976 in an effort to collect quality control techniques (Tague, 2004).  All of them were not 
created at this point, but were put together in a single work for managers to easily locate.  The 
tools allow managers to organize ideas and concepts to make better, more efficient decisions, 
which take into account all known information. 
2.5.1  Affinity Diagrams 
 The affinity diagram, developed by Jiro Kawakita in the 1960s, was created to expound 
on the brainstorming group creativity technique.  In brainstorming, groups of people come 
together and generate as many ideas as possible related to a single concept.  This method focuses 
on the power of the group to generate a larger quantity of ideas than any individual can (Osborn, 
1953).  Affinity diagramming takes this more generalized approach and improves upon it.  The 
brainstorming process is used to initially generate ideas, but through a process of organization 
and idea mapping, combined with subsequent discussion, the ideas are eventually sorted into 
descriptive groups.  Affinity diagrams are used in situations when there are a great many ideas or 
issues, which are in no apparent order and complex in nature (Tague, 2004). 
 The decision-maker benefits from the large quantity of ideas generated by the team by 
using the affinity diagramming technique.  The process begins by describing the problem and 
ensuring that all team members are familiar with the issues.  The brainstorming technique is then 
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used to gather as many ideas as possible.  These ideas are then written on individual note cards 
or “sticky notes.”  The members of the affinity diagramming team then physically begin to 
silently organize the notes into groups.  Each person in the process may have their own ideas, so 
some notes are moved several times, but no discussion is allowed during this process.  Once all 
notes are placed in groups or set aside for discussion, the resulting groups are discussed and 
examined by the team.  Finally, any “super groups” that have emerged are created by defining 
the individual groups and further organizing the cards.  The end result of this process is a number 
of groups and possibly hierarchies which describe ideas (Tague, 2004). 
 The Value-Focused Thinking process involves a top-down analysis approach, but at 
times, it is difficult to determine the lowest-level tier values.  Affinity diagramming provides a 
method for combining a bottom-up approach to the existing process to ensure accurate definition 
of the lowest tier (Pruitt, 2003).  Affinity diagramming is an appropriate technique, due to its 
ability to organize large amounts of complex information into groups with sub-categories being 
built into the technique. 
2.5.2  Other tools 
 In addition to affinity diagramming, there are several other tools commonly used in the 
management and planning industry (Tague, 2004).  Each of these tools is used for a very specific 
purpose.  Interrelationship diagrams, for example, describe the links and interfaces between 
ideas.  They serve to identify any cause and effect relationships that exist.  They are also used for 
complex issues, but are generally used as a follow-on to affinity diagramming when cause and 
effect relationships must be defined (Tague, 2004).  Tree diagrams may also be used to 
breakdown more general ideas into their components.  Tree diagrams often depend on affinity 
diagrams to first identify the issues upon which to expand (Tague, 2004).  Matrix diagrams are 
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another way of showing relationships between ideas, but they organize the relationships 
differently than an interrelationship diagram.  Matrix diagrams can also show relationships 
between multiple groups of information, while including specific information regarding the 
relationship.  They can be categorized into six different “shapes,” which can be used for different 
numbers of groups and different types of relationships (Tague, 2004).  Matrix data analysis then 
allows the decision-maker to perform complex mathematical analyses on the resulting matrices 
(Tague, 2004).  “L-Shaped” matrices are often used to prioritize ideas (Tague, 2004).  An arrow 
diagram; also known as program evaluation and review technique (PERT) chart, network 
diagram, activity chart, critical path method (CPM), or node diagram; is used to describe the 
order of tasks.  Arrow diagrams are very useful in showing chronological order of ideas.  They 
can describe when tasks precede others as well as durations (Tague, 2004).   
2.6 Net-Centricity 
 Net-centricity refers to the process by which several nodes in communication with each 
other operate.  In the evolving technological world, it is increasingly important that the complex 
network of personnel, devices, services, and information be connected.  The speed of 
communication and efficiency of passing information between this complex system of nodes has 
a major part in the decision-making process.  The information age has given society access to a 
large amount of previously unavailable information; it is now a matter of ensuring that the 
technology and infrastructure exists to move the information to the correct person at the correct 
time.   
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 Net-centricity has given way to Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) within the U.S. military.  
NCW is defined by Albert et al. (2000) as, 
an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased 
combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers, and shooters to achieve 
shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, 
greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. 
 
The concept of NCW is the idea of linking nodes to transfer information, thereby ensuring 
information superiority for the warfighter (Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 2000).   
2.6.1 Net-Centric Enterprise Architecture 
 As systems architecture grows, the importance of capturing the communication between 
nodes in a relevant manner is becoming increasingly important.  To emphasize this idea, Net-
Centric Enterprise Architectures are becoming the standard in the systems engineering field.  A 
net-centric enterprise architecture is formally defined by Nzuwah (2003) as,  
a light-weight, massively distributed, horizontally-applied client/server 
architecture, that distributes components and/or services across an enterprise’s 
information value chain using internet technologies and other network protocols 
as the principal mechanism for supporting the distribution and processing of 
information services.   
 
The concept of a net-centric architecture, therefore, is any architecture that makes use of 
technology to ensure the proper communication of all nodes in the system.  In the case of 
systems architecture, this can refer to not only the products themselves, but to the development 
of the products and the net-centricity of the instantiated system.  The system being represented 
by the architecture must also hold to the principles of net-centricity.  
2.6.2 Net-Centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI) 
 Currently, the DoD does not explicitly require the implementation of net-centricity; 
however, it has made the intended direction to move toward it obvious.  The DoD’s Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) has stated a goal to integrate data into a central network and change 
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the paradigm from data “push” to “pull” (Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 
2003).  To this end, the U.S. Navy Program Executive Office for Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force Electronic 
Systems Center and the Defense Information Systems Agency has produced the Net-Centric 
Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI) as a series of guidance documents.  NESI 
provides cradle-to-grave actionable guidance for the implementation of net-centric systems that 
meets the goals set forth by the DoD CIO.  NESI pulls together several sources to provide a body 
of knowledge encompassing architectural and engineering information for each step of the 
acquisition process.  In addition to the general guidance, NESI contains checklists for the project 
manager to ensure compliance with the guidelines set forth in NESI (US Navy Program 
Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, 2008).  
Unfortunately, at this point, compliance with NESI is not required by the Navy or any DoD 
agency (Eitelberg, 2008).   
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Chapter 3.  Methodology 
 
The Joint Force Protection Advanced Security System (JFPASS) has the unique 
challenge of creating a single, joint architecture to represent force protection across the services.  
This architecture must be understood by various stakeholders as well as represent an effective 
system, which will be the groundwork for all future force protection acquisition efforts.  This led 
the architecture developers to seek out a tool for evaluating and gaining insight into their 
product.     
Drawing upon Value-Focused Thinking (VFT), this research presents a Value-Driven 
Enterprise Architecture score for mapping architectural products to stakeholder acquisition 
values.  The generalized VFT methodology laid out in Chapter 2 is built upon in this section to 
extend to enterprise architecture evaluation with a value focus in application to the JFPASS 
architecture.  Each step of the process is examined in depth to build the final hierarchy.  This 
includes all steps up to and including step 7.   
3.1 Problem Identification 
 The JFPASS project grew out of the DoD’s need to be both more net-centric and more 
joint.  A series of architectural products were developed to meet this requirement.  This 
architecture has similar problems to other architectures in the lack of effective evaluation tools, 
but a new element for this problem is the extreme complexity of the architecture and the desire to 
examine both the architectural quality and the System Effectiveness with a single tool.   
 To solve the problem of evaluating the architecture, the research question was framed as: 
“How should common Joint Force Protection values be used to evaluate a “To-Be” architecture 
for net-centric force protection” (Havlicek, 2008).  In this case, the system is the JFPASS 
architecture.  To further define the problem, the context was first researched and defined.  
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Several documents refer to the protection of personnel, assets, and information as the three key 
areas to be protected in the context of joint force protection (IUBIP, 2006; JCS, 2004; Office of 
the CJCS, 2008; Office of the CJCS, 2007).  Figure 3.1 shows a hierarchy of the documentation 
and guidance that guides force protection.  Figures 3.2 through 3.4 specialize this idea to show 
the mediums from which each area must be protected. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.  Documentation Hierarchy for Force Protection 
  
56 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Protect Personnel Specialization 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3.  Protect Assets Specialization 
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Figure 3.4.  Protect Information Specialization 
 
 
 The National Security Strategy (NSS) provides the highest-level guidance for military 
operations (Office of the President of the United States of America, 2002).  The National 
Military Strategy (NMS) specifies the military portion of the NSS (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004).  
One of the four tenets of the NMS is force protection, which is divided into the protection of 
personnel, assets, and information.  The IUBIP specifies that the scope of force protection be 
across fixed, semi-fixed, and mobile sites.  Fixed sites are defined as those facilities in either the 
Continental United States (CONUS) or Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) where 
Mutual Security Agreements or Status of Forces Agreements exist.  Semi-fixed sites are any 
locations established for a temporary purpose, which includes expeditionary locations or 
locations in the CONUS or OCONUS that are no intended to be occupied for more than one year 
at construction.  Finally, mobile sites are those where a unit is performing its mission, including 
convoys, logistics patrols, or other movements between sites.   
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At each of the three types of sites, personnel and assets must be protected in the same 
basic ways, as the personnel generally depend on the assets (vehicles and buildings) for shelter 
and movement.  Often attacking an asset will have a direct affect on the security of the associated 
personnel.  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) 
risks, however, are only considered for personnel, since CBRNE threats do not have an effect on 
the assets, aside from denial of their use.  The CBRNE threat is intended to impact the personnel 
occupying the asset.  Protecting information is a slightly different concept.  Information must be 
protected in two contexts: the infrastructure that carries information and the access that 
individuals have to that information.  Access control involves not only electronic access control 
such as ensuring that only authorized personnel have access to the information, but also ensuring 
that access is not granted from person to person-to-mission critical information. 
 Within the context of protecting personnel, assets, and information, force protection must 
accomplish all of the DAWDR (Detect, Assess, Warn, Defend, Recover) activities.  For the 
JFPASS project, the focus of the architecture is only on the Detect, Assess, and Warn activities, 
although mechanisms exist in the architecture for the Defense and Recovery of a location. 
3.2 Create Value Hierarchy 
 The first decision to be made regarding the value hierarchy was the basic split of how to 
evaluate the system.  Two divisions of quality must be addressed: the quality and accuracy of the 
architectural views or products and the effectiveness of the instantiated system that the 
architectural products attempt to represent.  Due to the complexity of the system, the divisions 
were separated into separate branches.  This decision leads to better decomposability and easier 
operability (Kirkwood, 1997).  Splitting the architecture from the system also ensures 
independence and mutual exclusivity of each value, as some ideas apply to each side, but in a 
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different context.  Furthermore, the operability of the hierarchy is improved by making the 
hierarchy not only easier to read, but also extendable to other situations.  With the architecture 
and system aspects separate, both branches may be used independently in other projects.  Either 
of the two branches may also be replaced by another branch to increase accuracy for use on 
another system, thus making the hierarchy modular.  However, making this separation violates 
the desirable property “small size” of a hierarchy.  By separating the two values, the hierarchy 
would potentially be larger in terms of total branches, although the number of measures would 
stay the same due to the requirement to measure the same information, regardless of the outcome 
of this decision. 
3.2.1  Hierarchy Background 
  The initial value hierarchy created to address the problem presented in Section 3.1 was 
developed using “ilities” and the affinity diagramming process.  A representative list of ilities 
was gathered from various sources, including Ross (2006); McManus, Richards, Ross, and 
Hastings (2007); and INCOSE (International Council on Systems Engineering, 2007).  The 
internet website “Wikipedia” also contains a list of ilities, which was used to ensure that as many 
ilities as possible were gathered.  Since Wikipedia is a user-edited site, this gives a wider pool of 
quality attributes from which to pull at the risk of getting inaccurate information.  Since this data 
pull was intended only to gather terms, not definitions or uses, inaccurate information was not an 
issue (Wikipedia, 2006).  This search for ilities was done in place of an on-site brainstorming 
process, to ensure that previous research and uses of the quality attributes were represented in the 
list.  The full list of 98 ilities is shown in Appendix A.  Ilities were chosen for this exercise for 
their historical use in describing the quality attributes of various systems.  By finding all of the 
applicable ilities related to the project, it was possible to capture all of the necessary quality 
60 
 
attributes to describe both the architectural quality of the products and the effectiveness of the 
instantiated system. 
 In accordance with the affinity diagramming process, each of these ilities was written on 
individual note cards.  The affinity-diagramming team was then sequestered in silence to 
physically arrange the note cards into groups of similar qualities.  At the conclusion of the 
process, 30 subgroups were found.  This led to an interactive discussion of the groupings and 
further refinement of the subgroups.  This discussion first identified quality attributes and 
subgroups that did not apply to the JFPASS project.  The eliminated ilities were: composability, 
demonstrability, learnability, nomadicity, portability, predictability, seamlessness, testability, 
timeliness, trainability, and transactionality.  Composability refers to creating some new form by 
combining components.  While the construction of the system will be created through the 
combination of its components, the ability to do so was not considered a measurable quality 
attribute.  The actual combination of components is a design consideration that must be 
considered before any architectural products are produced.  Demonstrability and testability refer 
to the ability of the system to be demonstrated.  These ilities were eliminated because the 
JFPASS Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration is already in progress; therefore, the 
demonstrability of the system is assumed and is not required as a quality attribute.  Learnability 
and trainability were considered too vague due to the confusion as to whether the learning 
referred to the system or the system users.  Trainability is an attribute that will be considered at 
some point in the creation of the system, but as JFPASS is a “system of systems” still in the 
design phase, there is no way to definitively measure the ability of the system to be taught to 
others.  Nomadicity and portability were eliminated because the JFPASS is not considered a 
“mobile” system.  Predictability and seamlessness were also vague in definition in terms of the 
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JFPASS system.  Timeliness refers to the time required to create the system.  While timeliness 
could be defined to show when the system will be fielded and implemented, there are currently  
no time estimates or requirements for the fielding of the system.  Finally, transactionality was 
eliminated due to the connotation of its root word, “transaction.”  There will be no monetary 
transactions taking place as a function of this system; therefore, the ility was eliminated. 
 The resulting 22 subgroups were then examined for agreement and accuracy.  After 
minor alterations to the locations of certain words based on definition, super groups were 
formed.  The two primary supergroups were based on the decision to split the architecture and 
system qualities.  The groups related to the quality of the system being represented were placed 
in a supergroup called “System Effectiveness,” while the groups related to the quality of the 
architectural products were placed in a supergroup called “Architecture Quality.”  Architecture 
Quality is addressed by Cotton and Haase (2009).  The System Effectiveness supergroup is 
addressed here.  The group names shown in the following discussion and tables are based on the 
final decisions, following sponsor discussion.  
 The System Effectiveness value was subsequently decomposed into three second-tier 
values: Capability, Maintainability, and Interoperability.  Maintainability was comprised of two 
third-tier values called Dependability and Resiliency.  Dependability was further decomposed 
into Supportability and Reliability, while Resiliency was decomposed into Survivability and 
Recoverability.  Appendix B shows the final System Effectiveness quality attributes grouped 
according to value, along with their synonyms. 
Prior to creating the hierarchy itself, each value group name was defined to ensure that 
the synonyms that compose the group were accounted for in the final consideration of the group.  
Each of the value definitions are listed in Table 3.2.  These definitions incorporated the 
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definition of the quality attribute itself and the synonyms for the particular group name, as well 
as the value to the decision-maker.  Following sponsor discussion, the defined and grouped ilities 
were converted into a value hierarchy.  The resulting hierarchy is shown in Figure 3.5 
 
Table 3.2 System Effectiveness Value Definitions 
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3.2.2 System Effectiveness Hierarchy 
 In the creation of the value hierarchy, several naming changes, definition changes, and 
alterations to structure were required to create a representative hierarchy.  These changes were 
accomplished through further literature review and during meetings with the decision-maker and 
sponsoring organization.  The value hierarchy was created using the resulting groups of the 
affinity diagramming process, based on quality attributes.  This section describes the values 
found on each level of the hierarchy in more depth.  The initial draft hierarchy was presented 
during these meetings, resulting is discussion and ultimately validation by a panel of Subject 
Matter Experts (SMEs) and the decision-maker. 
 In the initial iteration of the value tree, the System Effectiveness branch was called 
System Value.  During a discussion regarding the naming and definition of the Capability value 
(which was initially named Effectiveness), it was decided that the term Effectiveness better 
described the entire System branch as opposed to a single value under the system branch; 
therefore, Effectiveness was promoted to the branch name to better describe all of the values 
under the branch.  Each of the values in the branch (Capability, Maintainability, and 
Interoperability) relate to the overall effectiveness of the instantiated system.   
3.2.2.1 Capability Branch 
 Capability was originally known as Effectiveness.  However, Effectiveness was decided 
to be too broad of a term to describe the purpose of the Capability branch.  The Capability 
branch was defined as, “A System’s ability to produce the expected or desired results on the 
battlefield.”  Subsequently, it is intended to represent the operational ability of the system to 
accomplish its intended purpose.  In other words, a system must have the ability to meet the 
objectives for which it was designed.  On the third tier of the hierarchy, Capability is 
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decomposed into Purposefulness, Practicality, and Flexibility.  These lower tier values serve to 
specify the ideas that make up Capability.   
 Within the context of Capability, the “the ability of a system to address the problem 
which it is intended to solve or the relevance of a system in a given context or situation” was 
called the Purposefulness of the system.  This value actually defines whether the system does 
what it is intended to do in the proper situations.  The value of Purposefulness is used to account 
for a major idea of System Effectiveness.  This value accounts for a great deal of the Capability 
of a system. 
 The Practicality of the system defines whether it can actually be realized.  Practicality is 
officially defined as, “The system’s ability to be achieved within realistic constraints, including 
economic, constructability, and timeliness.”  This value was considered important due to the 
inability of the system to accomplish its intended objectives if it cannot be constructed or 
implemented within realistic constraints.  Without a practical system, the goals of the system 
designer will not be achieved. 
 The Flexibility value was initially placed under the Interoperability branch due to a 
connotation involving its ability to change to operate with other systems.  However, a system’s 
ability to change in relation to other systems is primarily determined by its initial design once it 
is implemented.  Therefore, Flexibility was moved to better capture the system’s ability to 
change to meet changing and evolving operational objectives.  This allowed a more strict 
definition, which eliminated the problem of broad connotations for the word Flexibility.  The 
official definition of Flexibility is “the ability of a system to be changed based on operational 
need.  This changeability refers to its ability to be altered before, during, and after a conflict.” 
66 
 
3.2.2.2 Maintainability Branch 
 The entire Maintainability branch was validated by the decision-maker as being 
acceptable as initially presented.  Definitions of values were altered slightly to ensure maximum 
achievement of the decision-maker’s values.  Maintainability itself is defined as, “A system’s 
ability to be kept at its intended level of operation.”  Any system requires some type of regular 
action to ensure that its intended operation continues uninterrupted. 
 Below Maintainability, the first branch was called Dependability.  Dependability is 
officially defined as, “A system’s ability to continue operating at its intended standard.”  The 
Dependability branch refers to the maintenance of the system under normal operating conditions.  
Dependability deals with the “peacetime” operations and maintenance of a system.  On the next 
tier, Supportability is one of the values under Dependability.  This value deals with a system’s 
ability to operate as normal, given a standard maintenance schedule.  Dependability’s definition 
is “the ability of a system to be realistically sustained and remain functional and useful given the 
expenditure of a reasonable amount of effort.”  A reasonable amount of effort refers to 
operations performed in accordance with a standard maintenance schedule.  This value does not 
incorporate major alterations or repairs, only a normal recurring work program type of 
maintenance.  The second value under Dependability is Reliability.  The Reliability value deals 
with the ability of the system to continue its operation if maintained properly.  Reliability is the 
relationship between Supportability and the operation of the system.  Its definition is “the ability 
of a system to perform as intended and execute given functions if properly maintained and 
supported.”   
 Resiliency is the second branch falling directly under Maintainability.  Resiliency is “a 
system’s ability to be returned to its intended standard.”  If the Dependability branch deals with a 
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system’s operation during normal peacetime or uninterrupted operations, Resiliency refers to the 
system’s operation following some type of interruption.  In the context of Joint Force Protection, 
this interruption is some type of hostile action.  Resiliency measures how easily a system may be 
repaired following such an action.  Under Resiliency, the first of two values is Survivability.  
Survivability is the part of Resiliency dealing with a component’s ability to withstand some 
hostile action.  It is defined as “the ability to survive attack or other enemy action and continue to 
operate as originally intended or retain the ability of being repaired and restored to operational 
status.”  Survivability measures how a system operates once it has been affected by some hostile 
action.  The second Resiliency sub-value is Recoverability.  Recoverability is another portion of 
Resiliency referring to a system’s ability to be returned to full operational status following an 
interruption of operations due to hostile action.  It is defined as “the system’s ability to be 
repaired or recovered following an attack or other damage within an allotted time frame.”  The 
definition refers to repair and recovery, both of which are intended to allude to the returning of 
the system to its original intended operation or the state that it was at prior to the hostile 
interruption.  “An allotted time frame” is a time period at the decision-maker or user’s discretion.  
Any system or system component must be designed to be returned to its original level of 
operation within a specified time frame. 
3.2.2.3 Interoperability 
 Interoperability is the value which measures the ability of the system to operate in 
conjunction with other systems and nodes.  Interoperability covers both the net-centricity of a 
system and its ability to be used in different contexts.  Interoperability is defined as “a system’s 
ability to be applied within different contexts, including other services and organizations.” 
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 Interchangeability is the portion of Interoperability that accounts for the system and 
components to be useful across different contexts.  The decision-maker and subject matter 
experts felt that it was very important for components to be interchangeable.  Each system and 
component should be able to be changed out for another seamlessly.  This concept includes 
personnel as well as components.  Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines must all have the same 
basic knowledge on the systems in question and be trained to the same level in force protection 
awareness.  JOINT OPERATIONS are extremely important and to accomplish a truly Joint 
environment, all personnel must have a similar training base.  Interchangeability is defined as “a 
system’s ability to be applied within different contexts, including other services and 
organizations.” 
 Communication refers to the ability of the nodes within the system to communicate with 
each other.  Both infrastructure and common languages are important for this value to be 
achieved.  Communication is “the system’s ability to transmit information in timely and accurate 
way as to facilitate analysis, decision making, and decisive action.”  An interoperable system 
must send information between nodes quickly and with complete data integrity. 
3.3 Develop Evaluation Measures 
 With the full value hierarchy built, each lowest-tier value must be measured.  Therefore, 
the lowest-tier values were assigned one or multiple evaluation measures.  The goal of an 
evaluation measure is to determine the level of attainment of each value.  Table 3.3 lists all 
evaluation measures, including their important characteristics.  Although weights are not 
discussed until section 3.3, Table 3.3 also shows the global weights (λ) for each measure.  The 
source for each measure suggests where a scorer should start investigating the architecture to 
find the information.  Table 3.4 presents the definitions for each measure.  Given the vast range  
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Table 3.3.  System Effectiveness Evaluation Measures 
  
Measure Name λ Type Source1 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0.041 Constructed - Direct SV-5 0% 100% 
2 THREAT DETECTION 0.041 Constructed - Proxy OV-5 No Yes 
3 THREAT ASSESSMENT 0.041 Constructed - Proxy OV-5 No Yes 
4 WARNING PLAN 0.041 Constructed - Proxy OV-5 No Yes 
5 TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY 0.02 
Natural - 
Direct SV-7,8,9 TRL 1 TRL 9 
6 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 0.02 Constructed - Proxy AV-1 
Cannot be 
built 
Within all 
constraints 
7 MONETARY PRACTICALITY – INITIAL 0.02 
Natural - 
Direct AV-1 
Over 
budget Under budget 
8 MONETARY PRACTICALITY – MAINTENANCE 0.02 
Natural - 
Direct AV-1 
Over 
budget Under budget 
9 ADAPTATION 0.027 Constructed - Proxy SV-8 Static Easy, On-Site 
10 SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS 0.035 
Constructed - 
Direct SV-7 No Yes 
11 RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS 0.064 Constructed - Proxy SV-7 No Yes 
12 SYSTEM REDUNDANCY 0.04 Constructed - Direct OV-6 None All/Multiple 
13 RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS 0.026 
Constructed - 
Direct SV-7 No Yes 
14 JOINT OPERATIONS 0.033 Constructed - Proxy AV-1 No Yes 
15 NESI DEVELOPMENT 0.066 Constructed - Direct TV-1 No Yes 
16 NESI EVALUATION 0.066 Constructed - Proxy TV-1 No Yes 
Total of System Effectiveness Global 
Weights 0.600  
 
1. Primary source of information; other views may be required 
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Table 3.4.  Measure Definitions 
System Effectiveness Branch 
Value Measure Measure Definition 
Purposefulness OPERATIONAL NEEDS 
What percentage of operational needs are addressed 
by the system?  
Purposefulness THREAT DETECTION Has a Threat Detection Plan been established? 
Purposefulness THREAT ASSESSMENT Has a Threat Assessment Plan been established? 
Purposefulness WARNING PLAN Has a base warning plan been established? 
Practicality TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY 
What is the Technological Availability of the 
system? 
Practicality ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
Can the system be realized within Environmental 
Constraints? 
Practicality 
MONETARY 
PRACTICALITY - 
INITIAL 
Can the system’s initial cost be realized within 
current budgetary constraints? 
Practicality 
MONETARY 
PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE 
Can the system be maintained within current 
budgetary constraints? 
Flexibility ADAPTATION How well does the system adapt to changing threats? 
Supportability SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Have supportability requirements been accounted 
for? 
Reliability RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS Have reliability requirements been accounted for? 
Survivability SYSTEM REDUNDANCY The degree to which critical systems are redundant? 
Recoverability RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Have recoverability requirements been accounted 
for? 
Interchangeability JOINT OPERATIONS 
Have CONOPs been constructed to account for all 
organizations? 
Communication NESI DEVELOPMENT 
Was NESI Guidance taken into account when 
constructing architecture? 
Communication NESI EVALUATION Has a NESI evaluation been completed on the architecture? 
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of available products and latitude for which architects may use the products, it may be necessary 
to examine other products or views to find the information necessary for each measure.  In cases 
where a specific view has been created for the sole purpose of representing a certain type of 
information, that view will be considered essential in the measurement of the value at hand.  This 
accounts for information that may be extrapolated by the user examining several other products, 
but was not explicitly stated by the architect, when it is possible. 
3.3.1 Capability Measures 
 The goals of the measures under Capability are to collectively measure the attainment of 
the Capability value.  Capability is meant to determine if the system is able to produce the 
sponsor’s desired effects on the battlefield.  Through use of the Purposefulness, Practicality, and 
Flexibility values, the three major aspects of Capability are captured.  Each of these lower tier 
values must be measured to determine their effect on the Capability value. 
3.3.1.1 Evaluation Measures for Purposefulness 
 Purposefulness requires more than one measure to completely determine its level of 
attainment.  Four total measures score four separate aspects of Purposefulness as determined by 
the sponsor.  Each of these measures serves to determine a particular portion of the 
Purposefulness value.  This is where the Detect, Assess, Warn, Defend, Recover (DAWDR) 
construct was considered. 
3.3.1.1.1 OPERATIONAL NEEDS 
 The first evaluation measure under the Purposefulness value determines whether the 
system designers have accounted for the sponsor’s initial requirements.  The measure asks: 
“What percentage of the Operational Needs is addressed by the system?”  It is possible to trace 
each operational need to a requirement, to a capability, and ultimately down to a function or 
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system capability.  The DoDAF facilitates this primarily through the SV-5 product.  The SV-5 
alone is not capable of accomplishing this measurement, due to its lack of an explicit list of 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS.  The AV-1 product must be used in coordination with the SV-5 to find 
this association.  This measure is Constructed-Direct.  The SV-5 is a constructed product, 
through which the scorer may determine if OPERATIONAL NEEDS have been met by system 
components.  The measurement scale is not a common way of determining whether 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS have been met, as SV-5s require some architecture knowledge to read.  It 
directly measures the value due to the fact that determining if all operational needs have been 
accounted for determines the exact level of attainment of the value.   
3.3.1.1.2  THREAT DETECTION 
 The THREAT DETECTION measure grew out of the DAWDR (Detect, Assess, Warn, 
Defend, Recover) construct.  For the system to meet its purpose and accomplish its goals on the 
battlefield, it must account for at least the first three aspects of the DAWDR construct.  THREAT 
DETECTION measures whether a Threat Detection Plan has been developed.  At this stage of 
development, it is impossible to measure the actual quality of the Threat Detection Plan; it is 
only possible to measure its existence.  At a later time in system development, it may be possible 
to alter this measure to account for the quality of the Threat Detection Plan.  The activities 
associated with the Threat Detection Plan will be located in the OV-5 if it is available.  By 
tracing the system’s activities, it will be possible to determine if there are system activities that 
account for threat detection.  If a Threat Detection Plan exists, the activities that accomplish it 
must also be present in the OV-5.  If the OV-5 is not available, the OV-1 and OV-3 will be 
examined for a detection plan.  This measure is a Constructed-Proxy measure.  It will be obvious 
to any reader if the plan exists, making the scoring scale binary.  The measurement question, 
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however, was constructed for the purpose of this evaluation.  By using the activities associated 
with the plan as opposed to the plan itself, the scorer must make an inference that if there are 
activities, then the plan has been created; therefore, it is a proxy measure. 
3.3.1.1.3 THREAT ASSESSMENT 
 THREAT ASSESSMENT is similar in all ways to THREAT DETECTION, except it measures 
whether a plan exists to assess the threat once it has been detected.  This accounts for the second 
aspect of the DAWDR construct.  This measure will also examine the OV-5 to look for activities 
related to Assessment (with OV-1 and OV-3 as secondary views).  THREAT ASSESSMENT is a 
Constructed-Proxy measure.   
3.3.1.1.4 WARNING PLAN 
 WARNING PLAN is the third aspect of the DAWDR construct measured by this model.  It 
is also very similar to THREAT DETECTION and THREAT ASSESSMENT.  In this case though, the 
OV-5 is examined for any mentions of the activities related to warning the base population.  A 
warning plan should warn not only the base population, but also specific organizations as 
required.  Warnings may also be “tiered,” so that only certain people are warned depending on 
the purpose for the warning.  Warning plans may be very prevalent in the OV-1 and OV-3 in this 
case, as the warning of people relates directly to both the system boundary and node 
communication.  It is also Constructed-Proxy. 
3.3.1.2 Evaluation Measures for Practicality 
 The value of Practicality must also be measured using more than one aspect.  Since it is 
also a very complex issue and the definition calls for several layers of practicality, each of those 
layers must be measured.  Each of the measures of Practicality measures an idea that was 
declared to be an important measure by the decision-maker. 
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3.3.1.2.1 TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY 
 Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are described in the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook (Department of Defense, 2004).  The nine Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) were 
created by the U.S. government to “assess the maturity of evolving technologies.”  They allow 
the decision-maker to determine the  level of development of certain systems during the 
acquisition process.  TRLs are being used in this case to measure the overall Technological 
Availability of the system of systems.  The TRL of each component will be averaged to 
determine an overall TRL for the entire system.  TRLs measure Practicality by determining how 
easy it will be to actually construct the system.  They are capable of showing whether a 
technology is still in the very early development stages or available immediately off the shelf.  
This is a Natural-Direct measure since TRLs are widely used within the DoD and are intended to 
measure the Technological Availability of systems prior to acquisition.  Each of the nine levels is 
detailed in Section 3.4.  The SV-9 is the most likely location for TRL information.  The system 
developers have latitude in determining exactly which view will provide the TRLs for each 
component.  It is possible for the AV-1 to also have a more direct assessment of the TRL of the 
entire system. 
3.3.1.2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
 The ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT measure determines if the system can be realized within 
the environmental constraints of a given location.  Since the system is not in any specific 
location during the design phase, it is examined prior to construction to determine if it will fit 
into the environmental constraints of a given area.  For example, to protect the perimeter of an 
installation, the base could build a 20-foot high, 10-foot thick concrete wall around the 
installation and cover the entire installation with netting to create a protective “bubble,” 
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however, this method would be cost, time, and environmentally restrictive.  Since many 
environmental laws would be broken in order to accomplish this feat, it is considered 
impractical.  Most projects require some sort of Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before 
implementation, but at this level of development, an EIS may not be available.  It would be 
expected that language regarding the environmental practicality would be included in the AV-1 
of a systems architecture, but any environmental specification being adhered to will be located in 
the TV-1; therefore, the TV-1 is the primary location for this measurement.  This measure is a 
Constructed-Proxy measure.  This information is typically included in an EIS, but it is time 
restrictive for an architecture evaluator to do this.  Environmental Practicality is found by 
examining the technical standards for environmental wording.  At a later stage of development, 
this measure will no longer be Constructed-Proxy, once an EIS is available for review. 
3.3.1.2.3 MONETARY PRACTICALITY – INITIAL 
 In the previous example of perimeter detection, the large concrete wall could not be 
constructed due to its impact on the environment.  For this measure, the same concept applies, 
but to the cost of the wall.  The MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL measure determines if the 
program can afford the initial implementation cost of a project.  In order for the project to be 
completed within the DoD, funds must be realistic and available.  The Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook includes specific guidelines on funding and affordability (Department of Defense, 
2004).  There are several places within the architecture where costs may be incorporated.  For 
this evaluation, the AV-1 will first be examined as it contains overall system information and 
more broad concepts such as cost.  If information is not found there, other views, such as the 
OV-5, which has an optional “cost overlay” function, will be examined.  This is a Natural-Direct 
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measure since dollars are a common unit of measurement and the estimate directly measures the 
cost of the project. 
3.3.1.2.4 MONETARY PRACTICALITY – MAINTENANCE  
 This measure examines the “life-cycle cost” of the system.  Within the DoD acquisition 
system, both initial costs and life-cycle costs are required for a project to reach milestones within 
the process (Department of Defense, 2004).  Life-cycle costs provide an estimate of how much a 
system will cost to maintain throughout the entire effective life of the system, including disposal 
at the end of its effective life.  While it is difficult to determine monetary constraints in the 
future, it is possible to examine future budgets and multi-year plans to see if the gaining office 
can work the additional cost into their projected budgets.  This measure will also be located 
primarily in the AV-1 product.  MONETARY PRACTICALITY – MAINTENANCE is also a Natural-
Direct measure for the same reasons as MONETARY PRACTICALITY – INITIAL. 
3.3.1.3 Evaluation Measure for Flexibility 
 Measuring a system’s Flexibility is a difficult concept and requires very strict definition 
of the value.  Flexibility is defined based on its ability to adapt to changes on the battlefield; 
therefore, the measurement seeks to determine its ability to do that.  The Flexibility value has 
only one measure of effectiveness. 
 A system’s Flexibility is directly dependent on how easy or possible it is to change the 
system configuration quickly and effectively.  ADAPTION measures if it is possible to change the 
system and the considerations taken to do so.  The location of information such as this is not 
explicitly stated anywhere in the DoDAF views.  The first candidate view for finding this 
information is the SV-8, Systems Evolution Description.  The SV-8 tells the reader of any 
planned future improvements to the system or whether adaptations are possible.  This view 
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should provide information as to how easy it will be to alter the system as well.  ADAPTION is a 
Constructed-Proxy measure.  Since there is no standard system for measuring a system’s 
flexibility, a scale must be constructed to measure this concept.  Since the value is abstract, 
though well defined, no direct measurement will be possible; it is a proxy measurement of things 
that would make a system flexible. 
3.3.2 Maintainability Measures 
 In discussions with the decision-maker, it was determined that the Maintainability of a 
system is often absent from an architecture.  Although there are no DoDAF views that 
specifically require explicit information regarding how easy a system is to maintain, the DoDAF 
does provide a good vehicle for doing this.  The SV-7 product provides the performance 
characteristics for the components in the system.  Therefore, the evaluator must extrapolate this 
information from the SV-7.  There are obviously certain parameters to which the system is 
designed.  Such systems engineering concepts as “Mean Time-Between-Failures (MTBF),” 
“System Availability,” “Mean Time-To-Repair,” “Mean Uptime,” “Mean Downtime,” and 
“Reliability” have actual equations and methods for evaluation.  These things are normally 
specified in the project requirements, i.e., the system must be designed to meet certain reliability 
standards.  For these things to be designed into the system, design calculations must be done at 
some point and the standard must be included in the architecture.  The SV-7 is the view normally 
associated with such performance standards, but these characteristics are typically not included 
in the SV-7.  The measures for Maintainability are SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS, 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS, SYSTEM REDUNDANCY, and RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS. 
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3.3.2.1 Evaluation Measure for Supportability 
 Supportability relates to a system’s ability to be  maintained in its operational 
environment.  The SV-7 must be altered to include this information.  The measure for 
Supportability is simply named “SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS.”  If the system designers 
have incorporated supportability requirements into the design, they should be included in the SV-
7.  The official measure simply asks, “Have supportability requirements been accounted for?”  
The term Supportability Requirement refers to specific systems engineering concepts.  Mean 
Time-Between-Maintenance (MTBM) and Mean Time-Between-Replacement (MTBR) measure 
the time that the system is active between scheduled maintenance.  The longer this time is, the 
more maintenance is required; therefore, more man-hours are required.  The concepts of  
(Mean active maintenance time), Mmax (Maximum maintenance time), and  (Mean active-
preventative-maintenance-time) measure how much time is actually spent in the maintenance of 
the system.  These Supportability concepts basically measure the “down-time” and time between 
scheduled maintenance.  At this point of design, it is important only to determine if these things 
have been considered in the design and ensure that they are explicitly stated in the architecture.  
At a later time, it will be important to ensure that the times are acceptable (although the system 
must meet the basic requirements to be considered a viable alternative).  Through the use of 
these “career-field standard” equations (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006), the concept of 
Supportability may be measured, as these are the ideas that are intended to be measured.  It can 
be assumed that a system is supportable if it exhibits these qualities.  The question of 
Supportability is a constructed idea for this evaluation, thus, the measure is Constructed-Proxy.   
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3.3.2.2 Evaluation Measure for Reliability 
 The Reliability value has characteristics similar to Supportability.  Thought it measures a 
separate value, the way in which they are measured is similar.  The measure “RELIABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS” specifically asks, “Have reliability requirements been accounted for?”  It also 
looks in the SV-7 for similar equations.  Reliability seeks to measure the “up-time” of the system 
or the length of time that it is operational prior to disruption.  This measure assumes that proper 
preventive maintenance has been accomplished.  The evaluator should look for such equations as 
the Availability family (achieved: Aa, inherent: Ai, operational: A0) and MTBF (Blanchard & 
Fabrycky, 2006).  This measure is also a Constructed-Proxy measure as it uses the same type of 
standard equations to measure the concepts involved in this value. 
3.3.2.3 Evaluation Measure for Survivability 
 Survivability departs slightly from the method used to determine the other 
Maintainability values.  Survivability measures how susceptible a system is to hostile action and 
how that action will affect the system.  Redundant systems tend to remain operational through 
more hostile actions than systems with no redundancies.  SYSTEM REDUNDANCY allows a back-
up system to take the place of the primary in the case of failure or attack, thereby allowing the 
system to remain operational.  The “SYSTEM REDUNDANCY” measure determines the degree to 
which systems are redundant.  The OV-6, Operational Event Trace Description, will provide 
some insight as to whether there are intentional system redundancies present.  Through the 
OV-6’s use of chronological event depiction, it is possible to see which systems are performing 
similar actions simultaneously and whether back-up systems exist or not.  The measure in this 
case is Constructed-Proxy.  There is no standard way to measure redundancy; however, looking 
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in the OV-6, the scorer may be able to get an impression as to whether a system will remain 
operational after attack.   
3.3.2.4 Evaluation Measure for Recoverability 
 Recoverability returns to the construct in place for the Supportability and Reliability 
values.  Recoverability, however, measures “RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS” through the use 
of Mean-Time-to-Repair (MTTR) and  (Mean active-corrective-maintenance-time).  These 
ideas measure the length of time that it takes to actually repair the system after some failure.  
Whether the failure is through enemy attack or through some other type of system failure, these 
equations will account for how long a component takes to repair.  The SV-7 is also the source for 
these concepts.  Recoverability is also a Constructed-Proxy measure, as it uses standard 
equations and directly measures the concept of recoverability. 
3.3.3 Interoperability Measures 
 The final branch of System Effectiveness determines how well the system operates with 
other systems and between its own nodes.  Interoperability was one of the major focuses for the 
sponsors of the JFPASS; therefore, its measurement was important to the value of the 
architecture.  The two Interoperability values are measured through the use of three total 
evaluation measures. 
3.3.3.1 Evaluation Measure for Interchangeability 
 Interchangeability deals with the ability of the system components and nodes to be 
interchanged between service components.  In the Joint environment, being able to operate 
smoothly in any service context is vital.  The measure “JOINT OPERATIONS” is the sole 
Interchangeability measure, and it determines how many services have been involved in the 
development of the system.  The existing CONOPs for each service must be considered so that 
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no critical functions are ignored, thereby ensuring a fully interoperable system.  The matter of 
ensuring that each service component can operate within the context of the new system is a 
matter of training, but ensuring that their existing CONOPs and critical operations have been 
accounted for will speed the process.  The AV-1 document will outline how other services were 
incorporated in the design process, but the OV-2, OV-3, and OV-4 may also contain information 
regarding the other services’ CONOPs which were incorporated.  This measure is a Natural-
Proxy type.  The number of services is a constructed way of measuring this concept, and its way 
of measuring Interoperability is only a proxy for how the system will actually allow the 
Interchangeability of different services. 
3.3.3.2 Evaluation Measures for Communication 
 The ability of the system to communicate is essential to its basic operation.  Since this is 
a largely automated system, the nodes must communicate with one another.  In addition, the 
system must be able to communicate its processes with the users.  The Net-Centric Enterprise 
Solutions for Interoperability (NESI) guidance was used to determine the system’s ability to 
communicate.  The two Communication measures are NESI CONSIDERATION and NESI 
EVALUATION. 
3.3.3.2.1 NESI CONSIDERATION 
 “Was NESI guidance taken into account when constructing the architecture?”  The 
system designers should make use of this detailed guidance for net-centric systems.  Since the 
JFPASS is required to be net-centric and with the DoD’s shift to net-centric warfare, some 
standard of net-centricity is required.  Currently, NESI is the only set of consolidated guidance 
for determining how a net-centric system should look.  At this early stage of development, the 
consideration of the NESI guidance in the design is the best way to measure the design 
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component of Communication.  At a later time, it will be possible to measure how net-centric a 
system is, but components must be in operation in the field to actually see how they will 
communicate.  The primary source for NESI DEVELOPMENT is the TV-1.  If the NESI 
documentation is not listed in the TV-1, it may not have been considered.  AV-1 is a possible 
back-up as well.  NESI DEVELOPMENT is a Constructed-Direct measurement.  NESI is becoming 
the DoD standard for net-centric designs and if a system is constructed to the specifications 
contained within, then it is generally a communicable system. 
3.3.3.2.2 NESI EVALUATION 
 The NESI documentation includes many evaluation measures of its own.  This allows the 
system developers to perform an initial evaluation to ensure that their system is net-centric.  
Through the use of the checklists included in NESI, the NESI EVALUATION measure can 
determine how the system developers have done.  Again, at this stage of development, it is 
important only that the evaluation has been completed.  The actual results of the evaluation 
should be included as an appendix to the architecture, but the quality of the results will not have 
as heavy of an influence until the system reaches a Milestone B approval authority.  The NESI 
EVALUATION may either be found in the TV-1 or as an appendix to the architecture.  This is a 
Constructed-Proxy measure.  Although NESI is becoming a standard tool, the evaluation is not a 
direct measure for this model.  It is a way to determine if the evaluation was done through 
another system. 
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3.4 Create Value Functions 
 Following the creation of the full hierarchy including values and measures, Single 
Dimension Value Functions (SDVFs) were assigned to each measure.  The SDVFs served to 
convert the measure’s score to a value, based on the range of the measure.  These SDVFs 
converted the individual scales to value units ranging from zero to one.  These value scores may 
then be summed using the general additive value function.  All SDVFs were developed in 
coordination with the decision-maker. 
3.4.1 Capability Measures Functions 
 The OPERATIONAL NEEDS measure, under the Purposefulness value was scored on a scale 
of 0 to 1.  These scores represent the percentage of OPERATIONAL NEEDS addressed by functions.  
The SDVF is a monotonically increasing type; therefore, as more of the OPERATIONAL NEEDS of 
the system are met, more value is gained.  The value is gained in an exponentially increasing 
fashion, so that the difference between 0.1 and 0.2 is the same as the difference between 0.7 and 
0.8.  Figure 3.6 displays the SDVF for OPERATIONAL NEEDS.  This SDVF was validated by the 
decision-maker on 12 February 2009. 
 
 
Figure 3.6.  OPERATIONAL NEEDS Single Dimension Value Function 
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 The second measure of Purposefulness, THREAT DETECTION, is a binary measure.  The 
acceptable range of scores for THREAT DETECTION is either “no” or “yes.”  This measure 
determines if a Threat Detection plan exists.  The SDVF for THREAT DETECTION is discrete, with 
two bins.  All possible value is earned if the score is “yes” and no value is earned if the score is 
“no.”  Figure 3.7 shows a generic binary SDVF, which may be applied to any binary measure.  
All subsequent binary measures, of which there are a total of nine, use the SDVF in Figure 3.7.  
The SDVF was validated by the decision-maker on 20 November 2008. 
 
 
Figure 3.7.  Generic Binary Single Dimension Value Function 
 
 
 The last two measures of Purposefulness, THREAT ASSESSMENT and WARNING PLAN, are 
also binary measures.  These measures determine if either a Threat Assessment or Warning Plan 
exists.  The SDVF for both is discrete, binary as well.  All possible value is earned if the score is 
“yes” and no value is earned if the score is “no.”  Figure 3.7 shows the binary SDVF, which was 
validated for this measure by the decision-maker on 20 November 2008.  
No Yes
Category 0.00 1.00
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
V
al
ue
Binary SDVF
85 
 
 The first measure of Practicality, TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY, is based on a widely 
used scale called Technology Readiness Levels.  This is a 9-level scale; therefore, the SDVF is 
discrete with nine bins.  TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY determines the level at which 
technology is available for this project.  Table 3.5 shows all TRLs with their definitions.  As 
TRLs increase, more value is gained.  Though this Value Function is discrete, the bins take on an 
exponentially increasing value curve.  Therefore, the difference between TRL 1 and TRL 2 is 
much smaller than the difference between TRL 7 and TRL 8.  Figure 3.8 demonstrates this 
concept.  The SDVF was validated by the decision-maker on 11 January 2009. 
 
Table 3.5.  Technology Readiness Levels 
TRL 1 Basic Principles observed and reported – Lowest level of technology readiness 
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated invention begins 
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept 
TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment 
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment 
TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment 
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in an operational environment 
TRL 8 Actual system completed and ‘flight qualified’ through test and demonstration 
TRL 9 Actual system ‘flight proven’ through successful mission operations 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8.  TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY Single Dimension Value Function 
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 The second measure of Practicality is ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.  ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT is a discrete value function with four bins.  It is intended to measure the level of impact 
that a given system has on its environment.  For this measure, the bins were designed to capture 
increasing stringency of environmental laws and restrictions.  In this case, the lowest value is 
that a system cannot be built within any environmental restrictions, i.e., it will have a vast 
detrimental effect on the environment.  Contingency Operations environmental constraints are 
next in level of restrictiveness.  Following that, the CONUS or Contingency constraints provide a 
higher level of restriction.  Finally, since a system would have to comply with three separate 
levels of restriction; CONUS, Contingency, or Host Nation constraints is the most restrictive 
level of ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.  It is assumed that it is easier to design for CONUS 
constraints than it is to design for Host Nation constraints, since the corporations and designers 
are familiar with the CONUS laws.  There is a jump in value between having a system that can 
be built in Contingency and CONUS constraints.  Figure 3.9 displays the SDVF for 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.  This SDVF was validated on 20 November 2009. 
 
Figure 3.9.  ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT Single Dimension Value Function 
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 The third measure of Practicality is MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL.  This measure 
is a discrete SDVF with three bins.  It is intended to measure the attainment of the ability to 
construct a system within budgetary constraints.  To this end, the three bins were constructed to 
capture situations in which the system estimates fall above, within, and below budget.  The 
“Within Budget” bin refers specifically to estimates which fall within +/-5% of the given 
program budget.  Therefore, any estimate falling above 5% of budget qualifies as “Above 
Budget,” while any estimate falling below 5% of budget is considered to “Save Money.”  Figure 
3.10 displays the SDVF for this MONETARY PRACTICALITY measures.  It was validated by the 
decision-maker on 12 February 2009. 
 
Figure 3.10.  MONETARY PRACTICALITY Single Dimension Value Function 
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 The last measure of Practicality, MONETARY PRACTICALITY – MAINTENANCE, is very 
similar to the previous measure, except that it refers to the life-cycle cost of the project.  The 
SDVF converts value in the same way, with the same levels.  This is demonstrated in Figure 
3.10.  This SDVF was also validated on 12 February 2009. 
 ADAPTION is the single measure of Flexibility.  ADAPTION measures the degree to which 
the system is able to adapt to changing operational requirements.  This is measured on a discrete 
scale with five bins.  Each bin measures an increasingly easier method of changing the system 
configuration.  The lowest bins and therefore of lowest value is “Static,” meaning that the system 
is not capable of being changed once it is implemented.  The next level is “Unacceptable Effort,” 
which refers to a system which can be changed, but is cost and/or time restrictive to actually 
make the change to meet the mission at hand.  “3rd Party Acceptable Effort” refers to a situation 
in which the system can be changed within cost and time constraints, but a 3rd party must be 
“imported” to make the change.  In this case, users are not capable of changing the system as 
needed.  The next level is “On-Site Acceptable effort.”  In this case, the users are capable of 
making the change within cost and time constraints, though it may require such considerations 
and consultation from system designers, system downtime, or added cost.  The final bin and of 
most value to the decision-maker is “Minimal Effort.”  This refers to a system that is flexible by 
its very nature.  Any changes to meet operations requirements are quickly and easily made with 
little to no additional time or cost.  As the system gets easier to change, more value is added, 
with a significant jump in value, 0.4 value units, between “Unacceptable Effort” and “3rd Party 
Acceptable Effort.”  This value jump represents the value to the decision-maker of having a 
system that is capable of being changed.  Figure 3.11 shows the SDVF for ADAPTION, which was 
validated by the decision-maker on 20 November 2008. 
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Figure 3.11.  ADAPTION Single Dimension Value Function 
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measures the Reliability value.  Reliability considerations are a different set of design criteria, but 
are also found in the SV-7.  Value is earned in the same way as SUPPORTABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS.  Figure 3.7 demonstrates this in the SDVF.  This SDVF was validated on 20 
November 2008. 
 SYSTEM REDUNDANCY measures the degree of attainment of the Survivability value.  If a 
system has redundancies, then it is more likely to survive an attack.  To accomplish this 
measurement, a discrete value function with four bins was created.  As the redundancies on 
systems increase, more value is earned.  The bins represent a value “jump” when multiple 
redundancies are considered for systems.  The lowest bin is “No redundancy,” meaning that all 
systems are stand-alone and would constitute a loss of mission effectiveness if they were 
destroyed.  The next bin, “Some Systems have Single Redundancies,” captures the idea that 
some systems are given a single back-up to ensure their operation.  The decision-maker felt that 
it was important for systems to have more than a single redundancy in a force protection 
scenario; therefore, the next bin, “Some Systems have Multiple Redundancies,” captures the next 
level, which adds a great deal of value to the measure.  Finally, “All Systems have Multiple 
Redundancies” is the highest bin and level of value.  Figure 3.12 displays the SDVF for SYSTEM 
REDUNDANCY.  This SDVF was validated on 20 November 2008. 
 
91 
 
 
Figure 3.12.  SYSTEM REDUNDANCY Single Dimension Value Function 
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that the importance of having all service components is captured.  Without all four services, the 
interchangeability of the system is of no value.  The range for this SDVF is also “yes” or “no.”  
The only way to score 100% value or a “yes,” is to have all service components’ CONOPs 
considered in the design.  Figure 3.7 displays the validated (on 20 November 2008) SDVF. 
 NESI DEVELOPMENT is the measure created to determine the degree of attainment of the 
Communication Value.  This measure seeks to determine if the Net-Centric Enterprise Solutions 
for Inoperability guidance has been taken into account for the design of the system.  This is a 
binary, discrete SDVF, measuring either “yes” or “no” as to whether NESI has been used.  
Figure 3.7 shows the binary SDVF used for NESI DEVELOPMENT.  This SDVF was validated on 
20 November 2008. 
 NESI EVALUATION measures the same value in the same way as NESI DEVELOPMENT.  
NESI EVALUATION, however, seeks to determine if the system designers have completed an 
evaluation on the system.  Supplied in the NESI documentation are several checklists and 
measures for determining the net-centricity of a system.  The system designers must have 
completed these evaluations to gain credit for NESI EVALUATION.  Figure 3.7 shows the SDVF 
for NESI EVALUATION.  This SDVF was validated on 20 November 2008. 
3.5 Value Hierarchy Weights 
 To determine the importance of each measure, values must first be individually weighted.  
By determining local weights, the global weights are easily found.  This study uses primarily the 
direct weighting procedure, although an additional procedure using “Tornado Charts” was used 
for validation and final weight determination.  Table 3.6 shows each System Effectiveness tier’s 
values with their global and local weights.  The global weights for at each tier sum to 0.6 to 
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represent the 60% of the fundamental value accounted for by the System Effectiveness branch.  
All weights in sections discussed in section 3.5 represent the final weights following validation. 
Table 3.6.  Value Weights 
Value Tier Local Weight Global Weight 
System Effectiveness 1 0.6 0.6 
Capability 2 0.45 0.27 
Maintainability 2 0.275 0.165 
Interoperability 2 0.275 0.165 
Purposefulness 3 0.6 0.162 
Practicality 3 0.3 0.081 
Flexibility 3 0.1 0.027 
Dependability 3 0.6 0.099 
Resiliency 3 0.4 0.066 
Interchangeability 3 0.3 0.05 
Communication 3 0.7 0.116 
Supportability 4 0.35 0.035 
Reliability 4 0.65 0.064 
Survivability 4 0.6 0.04 
Recoverability 4 0.4 0.026 
 
 
3.5.1 Tier 1 Weights 
 A top-down approach was used for the majority of the weighting, although validation was 
completed in a bottom-up fashion.  Tier one was the first tier to be weighted (top-down).  With 
the split between System Effectiveness and Architecture Quality, relative weights had to be 
determined to find how important each of the two branches would be.  The local weights were 
found to be 0.6 and 0.4, respectively.  These weights account for the importance of the 
instantiated system versus the architectural products.  While the architectural products are very 
important, particularly in the acquisition realm, the value of the system being represented is of 
more importance. 
94 
 
3.5.2 Tier 2 Weights 
 The three values considered on Tier 2 of the Hierarchy were Capability, Maintainability, 
and Interoperability.  A direct weighting scheme (“100 coin method”) was used for these values.  
Initially, Capability was weighted at 0.40, with Maintainability and Interoperability both being 
0.30 of the value of System Effectiveness.  The decision-maker agreed that Maintainability and 
Interoperability were in fact of equal weight, but the importance of Maintainability and 
Interoperability in relation to Capability was adjusted.  The final value of Capability was found 
to be 0.45 of System Effectiveness, while Maintainability and Interoperability were 0.275 each.  
These final values incorporate the changes made during weighting validation.  Capability has the 
highest weighting due to the importance that the system is capable of performing its intended 
operations.  If a system cannot do what it is intended to do, it is little value to the user; therefore, 
the 0.45 weighting accounts for this major importance in terms of the system’s ability to do its 
job.  Maintainability and Interoperability are both important to the decision-maker, but are 
overshadowed by Capability. 
3.5.3 Tier 3 Weights 
 Tier three was weighted next using the local weighting method.  These values were 
examined branch-by-branch to ensure that each value was accounted for and no areas were left 
unconsidered.  Following the weighting, each value on Tier 3 was validated. 
3.5.3.1 Tier 3 Capability Branch Weights 
 The three values under Capability are Purposefulness, Practicality, and Flexibility.  It 
was unanimously agreed among the decision-maker and subject matter experts that 
Purposefulness was by far the most important value – possibly in the entire hierarchy.  With that 
knowledge, Practicality and Flexibility were weighted using a swing-weight style approach.  
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Practicality was agreed to be less important than Purposefulness and Flexibility less important 
than Practicality.  Next, relative weights were examined.  It was determined that Practicality is 
approximately three times as important as Flexibility.  This decision was made, because if a 
system cannot be practically constructed, then its flexibility does not matter.  Purposefulness was 
then agreed to be twice as important as Practicality.  This decision was made because a system 
may be practical, but if it does not accomplish its goals, there is no need to construct the system 
in the first place.  This process yielded weights of 0.60 for Purposefulness, 0.30 for Practicality, 
and 0.10 for Flexibility. 
3.5.3.2 Tier 3 Maintainability Branch Weights 
 The Maintainability branch is the only branch within System Effectiveness that contains a 
fourth tier of decomposition.  The first step for weighting this branch was to determine the 
weights of the tier-three values.  The tier-four values were examined after all tier-three values 
were weighted.  Maintainability has sub-values of Dependability and Resiliency.  Dependability 
refers to a system’s maintainability during peace-time operations, and Resiliency refers to its 
maintainability during hostile actions.  The weighting for these values was based on the 
frequency of occurrence.  Since the U.S. military has more assets that are operating in peace-time 
operations, Dependability was determined to be more important.  While the military has more 
operations engaged in peaceful actions, the operations vulnerable to hostile actions are 
considered to be of more importance to the completion of the National Security and National 
Military strategies.  This idea was confirmed by Subject Matter Experts.  Therefore, Resiliency 
was weighted at 0.40 and Dependability was weighted at 0.60.  Dependability being only slightly 
more important accounts for the mission impact of contingency operations, but the overall 
importance of the military’s peace-time operations. 
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3.5.3.3 Tier 3 Interoperability Branch Weights 
 The Interoperability branch was the last branch of System Effectiveness to be weighted.  
This branch accounts for Interchangeability and Communication.  The swing weighting method 
was used for this weighting.  It was determined first the Communication was more important to 
the decision-maker; meaning that the nodes communicating effectively is more important than 
the components having the ability to be interchanged.  With Interchangeability being the less 
important value, the discussion led to a determination that Communication was four times more 
important than Interchangeability.  This order of magnitude captures the extreme importance of 
the initial nodes performing their communication function first.  Their Interchangeability falls 
behind, since without communication, there would be no need to interchange. 
3.5.4 Tier 4 Weights 
  Following the completion of tier-three weighting, tier-four weights were examined.  Only 
three values of the hierarchy have tier-four values.  These values were examined individually to 
find their local weights.  Under the Maintainability branch, the values of Dependability and 
Resiliency were decomposed by one additional level, giving four tier-four values under 
Maintainability. 
 Dependability was examined first.  The sub-values of Supportability and Reliability 
compose the idea of peace-time dependability.  Supportability represents the ability to maintain 
the system and Reliability represents the system’s ability to continue standard operations if 
maintained properly.  Supportability was found to be less important than Reliability, based on the 
need for system “up-time.”  If a system is difficult to maintain, the system will be offline more 
often.  The most important thing about standard peace-time operations is that the system is 
operational more often than it is not.  Therefore, the decision-maker was willing to sacrifice 
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maintainability for more operational time.  Initially, Reliability was found to be twice as 
important as Supportability, but the validation phase found that Reliability was actually 0.65 of 
the value of Dependability and Supportability was 0.35 of the value.  This determination was 
made using the “100 coin method” during validation. 
 The second aspect of Maintainability, Resiliency, was weighted next.  A similar 
consideration was made for this value.  It is of more importance that the system remains 
operational during an attack than it is easily repaired after the attack.  Generally, more time is 
available following an attack and repair is not as critical; therefore, ensuring that the system 
never goes down is important.  The direct weighting method was used for the values of 
Survivability and Recoverability.  Survivability was found to be 0.60 of the value of Resiliency 
and Recoverability 0.40. 
3.5.5 Weight Validation 
 Following the initial value weighting, the entire Hierarchy was reviewed to ensure 
weights were accurate.  The weights were validated using the “tornado chart” weighting method.  
Each level of the hierarchy was examined from a “bottom-up” method.  The bottom-up method 
was chosen, so that as measures were re-weighted and adjusted, the weights of the higher levels 
could immediately reflect the changes.  A major advantage of the tornado weighting method is 
that it allows the decision-maker to see the relative importance of values in different branches 
and ensure that their relative placement is correct; therefore, global weights were used during the 
validation process.  Global weights are the weights of the value relative to all other values on the 
same tier of the hierarchy.  
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3.5.5.1 Tier 3 Validation 
 Tier three was the first level to be validated using a “stacked” tornado chart.   Since there 
is not a full fourth tier, it was not possible to start on the fourth level.  By stacking Tier 4 values 
and displaying on a single bar chart, the decision-maker was able to see both the tier-three values 
and the tier-four values at the same time.  Weighting was first done using separate Tier 1 
branches (System Effectiveness and Architecture Quality) and then combined into a single chart.  
In each chart, the relative placement of each value was individually examined to ensure its 
placement in the overall hierarchy.  Figure 3.13 shows the tier-three global weights for each 
value in the system branch.  When local weights are multiplied up through the hierarchy to be 
converted to global weights, their order of importance is found. 
 
 
Figure 3.13.  Tier 3 System Effectiveness Global Weights Stacked 
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 In the initial presentation of the value weights, Purposefulness was weighted similarly, 
but shared the Capability value with only one other value.  Once Flexibility was moved to the 
Capability branch, each of the three values under Capability were re-weighted.  Purposefulness 
maintained its original weight of 0.60 locally, giving it a global value of 0.162.  It was 
unanimously agreed that Purposefulness should be the most important value globally.  
Practicality was discussed next.  Its original weight was 0.40, but with the addition of Flexibility, 
was re-weighted to be 0.30 of the value of Capability and 0.081 global value.  Practicality was 
important enough to be in the top of values of importance, therefore its weight was monitored to 
ensure that it remained within the top five values.  Its final global importance was fifth overall.  
Flexibility was weighted at 0.10 as discussed in section 3.5.3.1.  Its global value was 0.027.  
Flexibility’s final importance was fourteenth of importance globally. 
 The tier three Maintainability values were examined next.  Dependability and Resiliency, 
with their sub values of Reliability, Supportability, Survivability, and Recoverability were 
validated by adjusting the weight of the subvalues to determine what effect it had on the overall 
values of Dependability and Resiliency.  Reliability and Supportability, the Dependability 
subvalues on tier four, were originally weighted at 0.60 and 0.40 locally.  These weights were 
adjusted to 0.65 for Reliability and 0.45 for Supportability.  This change was made to account for 
the fact that Reliability, being the system’s “up-time” is more important than the ease of 
maintenance for a system.  The 5% change to each value was made to adjust their standings in 
the tornado chart.  When examined together, these values make up 100% of the Dependability 
value.  Their global values were equal to 0.064 for Reliability and 0.035 for Supportability.  
These global values were used to examine the value’s standings on the Tornado chart.  This 
change placed Dependability above Understandability in the global rankings Tornado chart 
100 
 
(Figure 3.46) and in the top five of all values.  Dependability is more important than 
understandability, because the system’s ability to continue performance (maintenance time and 
system up-time) is more important to the decision-maker than the ease of reading architectural 
products.  It also assured Dependability’s place above Practicality on the System Effectiveness 
values only tornado chart (Figure 3.44).  Dependability itself (Reliability plus Supportability) is 
weighted as 0.60 local and 0.099 global on tier three.  Dependability is the third most important 
value globally. 
 Resiliency is composed of the subvalues Survivability and Recoverability.  Survivability 
and Recoverability were both accepted by the decision-maker with the weights as presented.  The 
Survivability value was presented as 0.60 local and 0.04 global.  Recoverability was 0.40 local 
and 0.026 global.  These weights were assigned as such to account for the importance of the 
system remaining operational during an attack.  It is important for the system to be recovered 
quickly, but the more critical time period is during the attack itself.  These subvalues combine to 
form the tier three value of Resiliency.  Resiliency, on tier three is weighted as 0.40 local and 
0.066 global.  These weightings place Resiliency as the sixth most important value globally. 
 Finally, the Interoperability branch was examined on tier three.  The two tier three 
Interoperability values were Interchangeability and Communication.  Due to the movement of 
Flexibility from the Interoperability branch to the Capability branch, Communication was re-
weighted to 0.70 from 0.60 locally.  This left Communication at 0.116 global value, making it 
the second most important value globally.  Interchangeability remained at 0.30 local weight.  Its 
global value was set at 0.05 and was the seventh most important global value.   
 Figure 3.14 shows all global values on tier three of the hierarchy.  This Tornado chart 
includes both System Effectiveness values and Architecture Quality values.  As shown on this 
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chart, six of the seven most important values are from the System Effectiveness branch of the 
hierarchy.  These rankings were validated based on the importance of the system to perform as 
expected.  The Architectural products are also important, but they only represent the instantiated 
system and therefore rank lower globally.  The one Architecture Quality value in the top seven is 
Understandability.  This value is placed in its location due to the importance of the architectural 
products to be understood and to effectively communicate the concepts of the future system to a 
wide audience. 
 
 
Figure 3.14.  Tier 3 All Global Values 
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3.5.5.2 Tier 2 Validation 
 Tier two validation was done using the same method as tier three.  Figure 3.46 shows the 
final global and local weights for the System Effectiveness values.  Following the weighting of 
the tier three values, tier two values were simply checked for their placement among other 
System Effectiveness values and other tier 2 values.  Figure 3.15 shows all values in Tier 2.  
Capability was validated at 0.45 local weight and 0.27 global weight.  Interoperability and 
Maintainability were both validated at 0.275 local and 0.165 global weight. 
 
  
 
Figure 3.15.  Tier 2 System Effectiveness Local and Global Weights 
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 When examined among other tier 2 values, Capability was still the most important value 
with its 0.27 global value.  Interoperability and Maintainability were the next most important tier 
two values at 0.165 global weight each.  This ranking confirmed Capability as the highest 
weighted value. 
3.5.5.3 Tier 1 Validation 
 The final validation completed was for the tier one values.  The only tier one values are 
the two major branches of the hierarchy.  System Effectiveness was weighted at 0.60 of the 
fundamental objective and Architecture Quality at 0.40 of the fundamental objective.  This 
accounts for the higher importance of the instantiated system, versus the architectural products 
that represent the system. 
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Chapter 4.  Analysis and Results 
 Following the finalization of the value hierarchy the existing architecture was scored and 
future alternatives were generated.  For the Value-Driven Enterprise Architecture, the JFPASS 
system was evaluated first.  Following this baseline score, the other generated alternatives were 
scored for comparison purposes.  A sensitivity analysis was then completed to determine the 
effect that the weights of each value had on the final score as well as the impact of each measure 
to the final score. 
4.1 JFPASS Architecture Scoring 
 The JFPASS system was examined first.  Each measure in the hierarchy was examined 
individually and assigned a score based on the existing architecture.  Since the existing 
architecture is at a very early stage of development, there are portions of value that have not yet 
been earned.  The instantiated system does not yet exist; therefore, only the architectural 
products were used as data sources in the scoring process.  Some measures may score higher 
based on information not yet included in architectural products, but since this information is not 
readily available to a third party reviewer and is therefore not verifiable, it cannot be included in 
the scoring of the system.  Some areas of value are located in very specific architectural 
products; therefore, if these products do not yet exist, some measures cannot be accurately scored 
until those products are created.  Value will be earned incrementally as new information is 
available during the life cycle of the project.  The scoring presented here is the baseline for future 
improvements.  The views available for scoring the JFPASS are listed in Table 4.1.  Table 4.2 
shows the final scores for each of the measures.  To score the alternatives, the hierarchy was 
entered into a proprietary software package, Hierarchy Builder v1.01© (Weir, 2006).  The 
Hierarchy Builder © package allows for all aspects of the scoring and analysis of a hierarchy.  
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Hierarchy Builder © also generates the Single Dimension Value Functions (SDVF) as entered by 
the user.  To determine the equations associated with the continuous SDVFs, a trendline was fit 
to the curve and the equation was exported from Microsoft Excel©. 
 
Table 4.1 Available JFPASS views 
AV-1 SV-1 
OV-1 SV-2 
OV-2 SV-4 
OV-4 SV-6 
OV-5 TV-1 
OV-6c  
 
 
Table 4.2 Scores and Associated Values 
Alternative Name JFPASS 17 February 2009     
Measure Score 
Global 
Weight Value 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0 0.041 0.001 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 0.041 1.000 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 0.041 1.000 
WARNING PLAN Yes 0.041 1.000 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 1 0.02 0.050 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
CONU.S. and Contingency 
constraints 0.02 0.800 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY – 
INITIAL Cost Unknown 0.02 0.000 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY – 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 0.02 0.000 
ADAPTATION Static 0.027 0.000 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 0.035 0.000 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 0.064 0.000 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 0.04 0.250 
RECOVERABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS No 0.026 0.000 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 0.033 1.000 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 0.066 1.000 
NESI EVALUATION No 0.066 0.000 
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4.1.1 Capability Measures Scoring 
 OPERATIONAL NEEDS primarily requires the use of the AV-1 and SV-5, although 
information may also be found in the OV-1, OV-3, OV-5, and SV-7.  The AV-1 provides a list of 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS upon which to base the analysis.  At a minimum, the AV-1 provides the 
system purpose and goals.  The SV-5 is then used to trace those requirements down to functions 
or components, thereby ensuring that each Operational Need is met by some portion of the 
system.  The AV-1 provided by the sponsoring organization had no information regarding the 
operational needs.  In addition, there was no SV-5 from which to trace functions to components.  
Therefore, the OPERATIONAL NEEDS measure scores 0% in this evaluation with zero associated 
value. 
 THREAT DETECTION was scored based on the existence of a Threat Detection plan.  At a 
later point in the development of the project, the Threat Detection plan itself may be graded, but 
at this point, its existence was the only important value.  The OV-5 was examined in this case to 
determine its existence.  OV-1 and OV-3 were also used for back up and additional information 
for the Threat Detection plan scoring.  The OV-5 has an operational activity devoted to the 
DAWDR concept of Detect.  Under this activity are many sub activities outlining exactly how 
the JFPASS will accomplish the Detect activity.  In addition to the information in the OV-5, the 
OV-1 shows a system component devoted to threat detection as well.  The THREAT DETECTION 
measure scored “Yes” with an associated value of one. 
 The same architectural views were used in the evaluation of THREAT ASSESSMENT as 
were used for THREAT DETECTION.  The OV-5 included a similar activity called “Assess,” which 
accomplished the activities required in a Threat Assessment Plan.  The OV-1 also includes an 
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assessment component in the system scope.  THREAT ASSESSMENT scored “yes” in the 
evaluation with an associated value of one. 
 The OV-5 and OV-1 were again employed in the scoring of WARNING PLAN.  The OV-5 
includes a Warn activity.  The OV-1 also includes a “Wide Area Alert” component.  There are 
some other aspects of the OV-1 which allude to a Warning plan, including the “Chemical 
Sensors,” “Lan,” and “C2,” all of which may accomplish a portion of the warning plan.  
WARNING PLAN scored “Yes” in the evaluation with an associated value of one.   
 The SV-8 view typically includes information related to the Flexibility of a system.  
Since an SV-8 does not yet exist for the JFPASS, other views were examined for information 
regarding ADAPTION.  No information was found to score ADAPTION in the existing architecture 
products.  ADAPTION was scored as “static” in this evaluation.  A flexible system must include 
information regarding flexibility, as well as how the system may be altered in the architecture.  A 
“Static” score yields zero value in this hierarchy. 
 The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) Scale was employed for the TECHNOLOGICAL 
AVAILABILITY measure.  Typically, an SV-9 would include the necessary information to 
determine the TRL of a component.  Since there was no SV-9 product, specific information on 
system components was searched for among the existing products.  The TRL was not explicitly 
or implicitly stated in any of the existing products nor was there information to extrapolate the 
TRL for any component.  Therefore, TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY was scored as “TRL 1 or 
No data” with an associated value of 0.05.  The lowest level of TRL was assigned since this level 
accounts for components that have not yet entered any phase of development.   
 The ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT measure was scored using the TV-1 product.  Section 3.93 
of the TV-1 is the Environmental section.  The guidance documents listed here include Mil 
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Standards for Environmental Engineering, Electromagnetic Compatibility, and Interference 
Standard requirements.  The documents included represent a cross section of some of the types 
of environmental guidance documents that must be considered in the design of an 
environmentally practical system.  The inclusion of these documents in the TV-1 assumes the 
inclusion of these documents in the design of the system.  The standards being used in this 
system are military and United States federal standards; therefore, the system was scored 
“CONUS and Contingency constraints” with an associated value of 0.8.  The inclusion of 
military standards shows that contingency environments have been considered. 
 Indicators for the MONETARY PRACTICALITY – INITIAL measure may be found in the OV-
5 product, although there are no specifically required views in DoDAF for estimates.  Cost may 
be included in a layer of the OV-5 for some tools.  If no cost is included in the OV-5, the OV-7 is 
also examined for possible cost elements.  The JFPASS architecture had no cost information in 
any of the available views; therefore, the MONETARY PRACTICALITY measure scored “Cost 
Unknown” with an associated value of zero.   
 MONETARY PRACTICALITY – MAINTENANCE measure also scored “Cost Unknown” in 
this evaluation.  The same views were examined for costs elements, but JFPASS did not include 
any cost information.  The life-cycle cost for the system is an important consideration for 
decision-makers, but this estimate was not available in the provided views, so the value 
associated with MONETARY PRACTICALITY – MAINTENANCE was zero. 
4.1.2 Maintainability Measures Scoring Score 
 Every system must be designed with tolerances for components to ensure that the system 
is within design parameters.  DoDAF includes a vehicle for these requirements by way of the 
SV-7 product.  Since the JFPASS does not currently include an SV-7; therefore, the existence of 
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design standards for supportability cannot be verified.  None of the other provided products 
include the information either.  SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS therefore scores “No” with an 
associated value of zero.   
 Reliability Requirement considerations must also be taken into account in the design of a 
system.  Since the SV-7 does not yet exist in the JFPASS, the equations and values required to 
ensure the inclusion of Reliability could not be located.  The architecture must include some 
verification of these items to ensure that they are considered in the system design.  RELIABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS scored “No” with an associated value of zero in this evaluation. 
 It is assumed that if redundancy exists of critical systems, these systems will be more 
survivable during an attack.  SYSTEM REDUNDANCY ensures more system up-time during hostile 
action.  The OV-6 event trace shows some evidence of system redundancies.  The JFPASS 
includes one OV-6c for a single system activity.  This view shows some evidence of redundancy 
in this activity.  Additional views show some evidence of redundancy as well.  Based on the data 
provided in these views, SYSTEM REDUNDANCY was scored as “Some Systems, Single 
Redundancy.”  This gave the SYSTEM REDUNDANCY measure a value of 0.25.   
 The lack of an SV-7 product does not enable the verification of RECOVERABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS.  These equations must be verified to ensure their inclusion in the architectural 
design.  Since they cannot be verified, this measure scored “No” with an associated value of 
zero. 
4.1.3 Interoperability Measures Scoring 
 The JOINT OPERATIONS measure is based on the consideration of all service components.  
Since it is a critical requirement that no service be left out, this measure is scored either “yes” or 
“no.”  In this instance, JOINT OPERATIONS scored “yes” based on information drawn from a 
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variety of views.  The AV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-4, and SV-2 were the primary resources used for 
this evaluation.  The AV-1 specifically contains references to all service documentation.  In the 
available Operational Views, there is evidence of other service requirements, such as port 
security and convoy security which alludes to specific service requirements and operations.  The 
associated value with this measure is one. 
 The TV-1 is the primary view employed in the evaluation of the NESI DEVELOPMENT 
measure.  Section 3.1 and 3.2 of the TV-1 refer to Information Technology.  Specifically, Section 
3.1.2, Common Infrastructure Data Format Standards, and section 3.1.3, Network Management, 
relate to the concept of net-centricity.  There are also documents related to wireless 
communications.  While the Net-Centric Standards for Interoperability (NESI) is not referenced 
specifically in the TV-1, the concepts set forth in NESI are accounted for based on the 
documents provided in the TV-1.  NESI DEVELOPMENT scored “Yes” with an associated value of 
one in this evaluation. 
 The evaluation criterion and checklists provided in the NESI Guidance were not 
completed for this system.  There is no evidence in the provided architecture that the system was 
evaluated for compliance with NESI.  NESI EVALUATION scored “No” in this evaluation with an 
associated value of zero. 
4.2 Deterministic Analysis 
 With all measures scored, a deterministic analysis was performed to find a single, 
aggregate score for the entire project.  Using the general additive value function, this score 
combines the associated values for each score as well as the weight of each measure.  This score 
is simply a weighted average of these numbers.  The Hierarchy Builder© software was used to 
generate graphs and do a comparative analysis of possible alternatives. 
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4.2.1 Additive Value Function 
 The general additive value function was used to create the JFPASS final score.  The 
general additive value function is represented as (Kirkwood, 1997, p. 230): 
     
Where v(x) = the overall score of the alternative,  = the value of the score on the ith 
measure, = weight of the ith measure, n = the total number of measure,  = 1.0 
Table 4.3 shows all measures and weights with the Architecture Quality measures 
included.  To obtain a score for the full system, the measures for Architecture Quality must also 
be used.  It is possible to examine the two branches separately, but this will give the decision-
maker an incomplete picture of the entire system.  The deterministic analysis for the System 
Effectiveness branch of JFPASS was completed using the entire system as well as the System 
Effectiveness branch alone.  For all analyses, the Architecture Quality score was held static from 
Cotton and Haase’s (2009) evaluation of the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eq 4.2 
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Table 4.3 All Measures and Weights 
Measure Description Global Weight ( ) Value 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0.041 0.000 
THREAT DETECTION 0.041 0.041 
THREAT ASSESSMENT 0.041 0.041 
WARNING PLAN 0.041 0.041 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY 0.020 0.001 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 0.020 0.016 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL 0.020 0.000 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - MAINTENANCE 0.020 0.000 
ADAPTATION 0.027 0.000 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS 0.035 0.000 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS 0.064 0.000 
SYSTEM REDUNDANCY 0.040 0.010 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS 0.026 0.000 
JOINT OPERATIONS 0.033 0.033 
NESI DEVELOPMENT 0.066 0.066 
NESI EVALUATION 0.066 0.000 
ACCESS 0.022 0.022 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY 0.011 0.011 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION 0.033 0.033 
PROTECTION 0.033 0.011 
FILE MANAGEMENT 0.021 0.000 
FILE FORMAT 0.021 0.021 
CONNECTIONS 0.013 0.008 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY 0.013 0.013 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY 0.013 0.013 
OV READABILITY 0.029 0.027 
SV READABILITY 0.029 0.021 
SCALE 0.024 0.014 
DECOMPOSITION 0.024 0.024 
TOOL FORMAT 0.012 0.012 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.025 0.025 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0.025 0.000 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.013 0.009 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.013 0.009 
SME INVOLVEMENT 0.013 0.000 
SME EFFECTIVENESS 0.013 0.000 
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4.2.2 JFPASS Analysis 
 The final score for the total system was found to be 0.538 out of 1.000.  Figure 4.1 shows 
a stacked bar chart of each of the two major Tier 1 values.  The System Effectiveness branch, 
though weighted higher (0.6) in the fundamental objective, received less of the overall weight.
 
Figure 4.1 JFPASS Score Fundamental Objective - Values 
 Figure 4.2 shows the VDEA Score score sorted by measure.  In this example, each 
measure’s value and global weight accounts for a portion of the bar chart.  While Purposefulness 
is the highest weighted value, it has four measures intended to measure the concept.  Therefore, 
each of those four measures have a smaller global weight.  NESI DEVELOPMENT and NESI 
EVALUATION, however, have only one measure to determine the degree of attainment of the 
value; therefore, their measures’ global weights are higher.  The high global weight and 
associated value of NESI DEVELOPMENT and NESI EVALUATION cause these measures to be 
among the highest weighted measures.  It is evident in Figure 4.2 that a large portion of value 
was lost due to the lack of a performing a NESI EVALUATION and the lack of OPERATIONAL 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.538
System Effectiveness Architecture Quality
JFPASS Current System 
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NEEDS attainment.  Three of th four Maintainability measures rank third, sixth, and seventh in 
possible global weight of the system.  Some value was earned by SYSTEM REDUNDANCY, but no 
value was earned by Reliability or SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS.   
 Of the 0.60 total possible value of the fundamental objective, the System Effectiveness 
branch of the hierarchy earned 41.3% of its value.  This equates to 0.248 of the 0.600 possible 
value units for System Effectiveness.  Figure 4.3 shows the measures under the System 
Effectiveness branch only.  This figure and score does not take into account any of the 
Architecture Quality measures or scores.   
 
Figure 4.2 JFPASS Score Fundamental Objective - Measures 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.538
NESI Development NESI Evaluation
Reliabil ity Requirements Operational Needs
Threat Detection Threat Assessment
Warning Plan Redundancy
Supportabil ity Requirements Access Control
Document Protection Joint Operations
DoDAF Compliancy OV Readability
SV Readability Adaptation
Recoverabil ity Requirements Scale
Decomposition Access
File Management File Format
Technological Availability Environmental Impact
Monetary Practicality - Initial Monetary Practicality - Maintenance
Requirement Traceabil ity SME Effectiveness
SME Involvement Connections
Architecture Redundancy Architecture Economy
Tool Format Product Locatabil ity
Internal Consistency External Consistency
JFPASS Current System 
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Figure 4.3 System Effectiveness Score – Measures 
 
 When examining the System Effectiveness branch alone in figure 4.3, it is evident where 
value was lost in the system.  NESI EVALUATION, RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS, and 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS are the three highest ranking measures that did not score any value.  
SYSTEM REDUNDANCY earned 0.25 of its total possible value, but none of the other 
Maintainability measures, SUPPORTABILITY and RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS, earned any 
value.  JOINT OPERATIONS earned full value, but ADAPTATION, TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY, 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.413
NESI Development NESI Evaluation
Reliability Requirements Operational Needs
Threat Detection Threat Assessment
Warning Plan Redundancy
Supportability Requirements Joint Operations
Adaptation Recoverability Requirements
Technological Availability Environmental Impact
Monetary Practicality - Initial Monetary Practicality - Maintenance
JFPASS Current System 
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MONETARY PRACTICALITY – INITIAL, and MONETARY PRACTICALITY – MAINTENANCE did not 
earn any value.   
 The next area of the hierarchy to be analyzed was the Capability branch of the System 
Effectiveness branch.  Capability earned 51.4% of its total possible value (45% of System 
Effectiveness).  The measures providing value to this branch are THREAT DETECTION, THREAT 
ASSESSMENT, WARNING PLAN, TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY, and Environmental 
Practicality.  Figure 4.4 shows the bar chart of this branch.  The Interoperability branch and 
Maintainability branch each only contributed one measure worth of value to the total score.  
Additional bar charts for the System Effectiveness Branch are found in Appendix C.   
 
Figure 4.4 Capability Score – Measures 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.514
Operational Needs Threat Detection
Threat Assessment Warning Plan
Adaptation Technological Availability
Environmental Impact Monetary Practicality - Initial
Monetary Practicality - Maintenance
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4.2.3 Gap Analysis 
 The actual generation of alternatives was completed via a gap analysis.  This gap analysis 
allows the model builder to determine how much of an affect each measure has on the overall 
score.  By adjusting the score of each measure and evaluating the total system score, the gap 
between the current value and highest possible (or lowest possible) value can be found.  Table 
4.4 shows the results of this sensitivity analysis in the range of each measure’s scoring 
possibilities.  The range is shown in the low and high columns.  The “current” column shows the 
current overall system score, with the final column showing the gap between the current system 
score and the highest possible score that could be attained by maximizing the measure in 
question. 
Table 4.4 Gap Analysis Score Ranges 
  Global Value 
Measure Low High Current Gap 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0.538 0.578 0.538 0.040 
THREAT DETECTION 0.497 0.538 0.538 0.041 
THREAT ASSESSMENT 0.497 0.538 0.538 0.041 
WARNING 0.497 0.538 0.538 0.041 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
AVAILABILITY 0.538 0.557 0.538 0.019 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 0.521 0.542 0.538 0.021 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
INITIAL 0.538 0.558 0.538 0.020 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE 0.538 0.558 0.538 0.020 
ADAPTATION 0.538 0.565 0.538 0.027 
JOINT OPERATIONS 0.505 0.538 0.538 0.033 
NESI DEVELOPMENT 0.472 0.538 0.538 0.066 
NESI EVALUATION 0.538 0.604 0.538 0.066 
SUPPORTABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS 0.538 0.572 0.538 0.034 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS 0.538 0.602 0.538 0.064 
SYSTEM REDUNDANCY 0.528 0.567 0.538 0.039 
RECOVERABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS 0.538 0.564 0.538 0.026 
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4.2.3.1 Capability Measurement Sensitivity 
 The OPERATIONAL NEEDS measurment was altered by increasing the score by 10% or 0.1 
incrementally.  Each incremental increase created a new alternative.  The ten created alternatives 
showed a gap of 0.04 value units between the lowest score of OPERATIONAL NEEDS and the 
highest score.   
 The THREAT DETECTION measure is a binary measure; therefore, there are only two 
scoring possibilities.  Since the current score is set to “yes,” the alternative to this measurement 
scenario is if the measurement was scored “no.”  The alternative was worth less value than the 
current situation, with a loss of 0.041 value units.  THREAT ASSESSMENT is the same in all ways 
to the THREAT DETECTION measurement in sensitivity.  The range is also 0.041, as well as the 
binary nature.  The WARNING PLAN measure is also similar to THREAT DETECTION and THREAT 
ASSESSMENT.  It also has a range of 0.041 meaning that if it were to be scored “no,” the 
maximum global system value lost would be 0.041. 
 TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY had a total of nine generated alternatives for sensitivity 
analysis.  The TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY measurement was set to each TRL level for each 
alternative and the range for the TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY measure was found.  The range 
was 0.019 change in value unit from the lowest score to the highest score of TECHNOLOGICAL 
AVAILABILITY.  The current score of this measure was “Unknonwn/TRL 1,” therefore any 
additional information or change to this measure would cause an increase to the total system 
score.   
 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT measurement has four possible score settings.  This gives 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT a range of 0.021, from 0.521 to 0.538 total system scores.  The current 
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system score is 0.538 with only one higher score possible.  Therefore, only 0.004 value units are 
available for ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.   
 MONETARY PRACTICALITY – INITIAL has four possible score categories.  The current 
score of this measure earns no value, therefore any change to the score would cause an increase 
to the total system score.  The possible change is 0.20 globally.  Figure 4.32 and 4.33 show the 
global and local measure sensitivity.  MONETARY PRACTICALITY – MAINTENANCE has the same 
range and numerical value possibilities as MONETARY PRACTICALITY – INITIAL.   
 ADAPTION has five possible value categories.  Currently the ADAPTION measure earns no 
value, therefore any increase in measurement will cause an increase in total system score.  The 
range of scores for ADAPTION is 0.027 globally.  While ADAPTION has a smaller effect on the 
total system score, any value earned helps the overall system score. 
4.2.3.2 Maintainability Measurement Sensitivity 
 SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS is a binary measure, which is currently measured at its 
lower value possibility.  If the score is set to “yes,” the possible change in value is 0.034 value 
units.  This change in overall score indicates that this measurement will have a significant impact 
on the overall score. 
 The RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS measure is also a binary scoring set.  Since the 
Reliability value has a higher global weight, the range in score change is larger for this measure 
of Maintainability.  The VDEA score range is 0.064 for RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS.  
 RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS is also a binary measure.  It is similar to both 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS and RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS and is currently scored as 
“no.”  The range for this measure is 0.538 – 0.564, meaning that the highest possible value 
change between the lower score and higher score is 0.026. 
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 The SYSTEM REDUNDANCY measure is rated on a scale of four possible levels.  The 
current system is scored at the second level.  The range between the lowest and highest scoring 
possibilities is 0.039 value units.  As one of the four Maintainability measures, SYSTEM 
REDUNDANCY is an important design consideration, which is evident in its effect on the total 
system score. 
4.2.3.3 Interoperability Measures Sensitivity 
 The JOINT OPERATIONS measurement scored “yes” in this evaluation, giving it its full 
possible value.  If it had been scored no, the greatest change to the total system score would have 
been 0.033 value units, taking the system score to 0.505.  This is a relatively large change for a 
single measure, indicating that the JOINT OPERATIONS measurement is of great importance. 
 The NESI DEVELOPMENT measurement is a binary measure, currently scored at its higher 
score of “yes.”  NESI DEVELOPMENT is one of the more important measures in this evaluation, 
with a global weight of 0.066.  Therefore, its impact on the total score is higher than most other 
measures.  The swing between its higher and lower score possibilities is 0.066 value units.  This 
makes the lower possible range of the VDEA score to 0.472 for this measure.   
 The final measure on the System Effectiveness branch of the hierarchy was NESI 
EVALUATION.  This measure also has a high global weight making it a relatively important 
measure.  In this case, the system scored at the lower possibility, therefore if the score was 
changed to “yes,” the change in VDEA score would be 0.066, taking the total score to 0.604. 
4.2.4 Alternative Generation 
 Step six of the Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) process is the Alternative Generation step.  
In the standard VFT process, at this point, the hierarchy would be used to find alternatives which 
fit the evaluation criteria.  In the case of the Joint Force Protection Advanced Security System 
121 
 
(JFPASS), though, a single alternative was created by the decision-maker.  However, several 
additional alternatives were generated as comparison criteria for the decision-maker.  These 
alternatives also demonstrated the additional insight to be gained from the VFT process.   
 When generating alternatives, two approaches were taken.  First, a set of alternatives was 
generated which represented the baseline or current system with improvements.  These 
alternatives show future iterations of the system with a product focus, in which new products are 
added to the architecture with the intent of improving the VDEA score.  The second set of 
alternatives represents random scoring scenarios.  These scenarios do not take into account the 
current or baseline architecture.  
 Table 4.5 shows the alternatives that were generated for the decision-maker.  These 
alternatives represent different versions of the architecture.  In Table 3.8, each measure is linked 
to its source views.  The “Perfect Architecture” represents an architecture that scores 100% value 
in all currently available System Effectiveness areas as an upper bound.  The “Current 
Architecture” or “Baseline” is the architecture as provided by the sponsor.  Other alternatives 
represent possible alterations to the existing architecture, based on the addition of more views.  
The views used for additional alternatives were determined based on the sources for measures 
(Table 4.6) and the gap analysis shown in Figure 4.5.  By determining where the current 
architecture lost value, it was possible to generate alternatives that filled those gaps by adding the 
necessary views.  For example, the OPERATIONAL NEEDS measure requires at a minimum an 
AV-1 and SV-5, in addition to all existing views, to earn full value.  Therefore, an alternative 
was created for a full AV-1 and SV-5, which assumes that these products include the minimum 
information necessary to assign full value to OPERATIONAL NEEDS.   
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Table 4.5.  Generated Alternatives 
Perfect Architecture 
Baseline 
Baseline plus OV-3 
Baseline plus SV-5 
Baseline plus SV-7 
Baseline plus SV-8 
Baseline plus SV-9 
Baseline plus full AV-1 
Baseline plus AV-1 and SV-7 
Baseline plus AV-1, SV-7, and SV-5 
Baseline plus SV-7, SV-8, and SV-9 
Random VDEA Score 1 
Random VDEA Score 2 
Random VDEA Score 3 
Random VDEA Score 4 
 
Table 4.6.  Required Views for Measures (Osgood, 2009) 
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Figure 4.5.  Gap Analysis 
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 Baseline plus SV-7 (in addition to existing products) is an alternative created to show the 
difference in score if the Maintenance value measures (except SYSTEM REDUNDANCY) were 
assigned full values.  Without an SV-7, it is very difficult to score these measures.  The OV-3 
alternative exists since it is a supporting view for four measures.  Baseline plus SV-5 
demonstrates the effect of adding only an SV-5 without a full AV-1.  Baseline plus SV-8 shows 
the value associated with adding an SV-8 and Baseline plus SV-9 shows the value associated 
with adding an SV-9.  The SV-8 and SV-9 products account for the TECHNOLOGICAL 
AVAILABILITY and ADAPTION measures.  An alternative was also created that incorporates a full 
AV-1, SV-7, and SV-5, which allows the hierarchy to maximize the OPERATIONAL NEEDS 
measure, as well as three of the Maintainability measures.  Finally, an alternative was generated 
that includes an SV-7, SV-8, and SV-9.  This alternative represents a situation in which 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY, ADAPTATION, and three of the four Maintainability measures.  
The full scoring scheme for each of these alternatives is shown in Appendix D. 
The second set of generated alternatives was produced by allowing each measure’s score 
to take on a random value.  In cases where the measurement was on a continuous interval, a 
random number was selected on that interval.  In cases where the measure could take on discrete 
categorical values, each category was given equal likelihood of occurrence for selection.  Once 
all scoring scenarios were generated, the related value was summed to obtain an cumulative 
score.  This process was performed 500 times and four of these 500 cases are presented as 
alternatives.  Since measurements are independent and mutually exclusive, each measurement 
score may take on any scoring value without an effect on the measurement of other values.  
These alternatives produced from Monte Carlo sampling are intended to provide additional 
comparison criteria for the baseline.   
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 Monte Carlo generation of alternatives was completed using a spreadsheet.  To obtain the 
composite random scores, the Architecture Quality scores were held static with their current 
values.  A Monte Carlo sampling technique was used to randomize System Effectiveness 
measurements.  This measurement was then transformed to a value using the SDVF and 
multiplied by its measure weight ( ).  The composite score was for each alternative was 
calculated by summing all values for each measure.  Five hundred separate scoring iterations 
were created.  These 500 new “alternatives” represented 500 different possible alternatives with 
random measurements for each measure, and therefore a random score.  They do not represent 
the current JFPASS value or measurement, only hypothetical VDEA scores.  Once the set of 500 
scores were produced, a random number generator was used to select four of the iterations from 
the set of 500.  Each of the numbers selected represented a random score of the VDEA 
instrument.  The random selector chose random alternatives 26, 207, 379, and 420l; hereafter 
called Random VDEA Score alternatives.  Each of these situations were then entered to the 
Hierarchy Builder© software and analyzed alongside the other generated alternatives.   
4.2.5 Alternative Analysis 
 As a part of the JFPASS deterministic analysis, each of the generated alternatives were 
also examined.  Appendix D shows the scores for each of the measures in each alternative.  
Figure 4.6 shows the rankings and scores of all alternatives.  It is important to note that though 
the addition of certain views may not help the overall score of the system, that does not mean 
that those views at not useful.  Each view within DoDAF serves a specific purpose and should 
not be discounted if the information contained within it is helpful to the system designers or 
decision-maker.  This analysis is based on the information that is important the scoring of the 
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system based on the decision-maker’s values.  If additional views are required, they may not 
impact the score of the system, but this does not lessen their importance to system design. 
 
Figure 4.6 All Alternatives and Scores 
 The Perfect System score represents a system in which all System Effectiveness measures 
have scored their maximum value.  The Architecture Quality scores were held constant from 
Random VDEA Score 1    0.454
Baseline    0.538
Baseline plus Full  AV-1    0.538
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Cotton and Haase’s (2009) evaluation of the system.  With all System Effectiveness scores 
maximized, the system scored 0.890 of 1.000 possible value units.   
 The highest scoring “non-perfect” alternative was a situation in which SV-7, SV-8, and 
SV-9 products are added.  The addition of these views allows for the maximization of 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY, ADAPTATION, and three of the four Maintainability measures.  
Each of these views maximizes different areas of the hierarchy, to show the additive advantages 
of creating additional views.  This alternative scored 0.709 of 1.000 possible value units. 
 The next highest scoring alternative was the current system with and AV-1, SV-7, and 
SV-5 added.  Adding these views allows the system to maximize both the OPERATIONAL NEEDS 
measure as well as the Maintainability measures.  The addition of a full AV-1 and SV-5 allows 
for OPERATIONAL NEEDS to be maximized, while the SV-7 allows for the Maintainability 
measures to be maximized.  This alternative scored 0.704 out of 1.000 value units. 
 The Random VDEA Score 4 alternative represents a random scoring situation.  The 
individual scores for each measure of Random alternative 4 are shown in Appendix D.  Random 
alternatives were generated to demonstrate to the decision-maker additional possible scoring 
situations which may not have been considered in the generation of other alternatives.  This 
allows the decision-maker other means to achieve a certain level of architecture value. 
 JFPASS with SV-7 was the next highest scoring alternative.  This alternative is meant to 
demonstrate the effect that the addition of an SV-7 that includes the necessary documentation for 
the Maintainability measures would have on the system score.  SV-7 is therefore the next most 
important view to be added to the existing architecture.  This view would provide the required 
information to prove that the values under Maintainability were considered in the system design.  
The score for this measure was 0.663. 
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 Random VDEA Score 3 scored the next highest value.  This alternative scored 0.583.  
The JFPASS alternative that includes AV-1 and SV-5 allows the OPERATIONAL NEEDS measure 
to be maximized.  By adding these views with the required information, the score of the system 
becomes 0.578.  The SV-8 product allows the system to maximize its score for ADAPTION.  If 
this view is created, with necessary information for an improved ADAPTION score, the total 
system score increases from 0.538 to 0.565.   
 SV-9 allows for a similar increase in value.  The addition of an AV-9 view will allow for 
the TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY measure to be scored higher.  This measure is more difficult 
though.  There is a possibility that simply adding the SV-9 product will not increase the score.  
Since the TRL is based on the actual availability of technology, in order to maximize the TRL 
scoring, the technology used in the system must rate higher on the TRL scale.  The creation of 
this alternative allows the decision-maker to see how much of an effect the maximization of 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY will have on the total system score.   
 Random VDEA Score 2 scored the next highest on the list of alternatives.  This random 
alternative had a score of 0.540 and represents a system with very minor changes to the current 
configuration.  In addition, this alternative shows the effects of failing to maximize or earn value 
on some of the views that the baseline has achieved value on. 
 The next three alternatives all scored the same as the current JFPASS system.  The 
addition of an SV-5 product by itself does not add any value to the system.  The SV-5 is used to 
trace capabilities to system functions, but without a list of OPERATIONAL NEEDS, the SV-5 does 
not add much value based on what is important to the decision-maker.  The SV-5 is only useful 
when combined with a complete AV-1.  Without the SV-5, though, a more complete and explicit 
AV- 1 is of little value as well.  The system with an OV-3 added also does not earn any 
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additional value.  This was the last view that could possibly add value to the system or was 
useful in the determination of the scoring of some values.  The OV-3 is used for the score of 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS, THREAT DETECTION, THREAT ASSESSMENT, WARNING PLAN, and JOINT 
OPERATIONS.  Since the OV-3 is only a supplemental view for determining the score of these 
measures, its additional does not help the current system.  In the case of THREAT DETECTION, 
THREAT ASSESSMENT, WARNING PLAN, and JOINT OPERATIONS, these measures were already 
scored at maximum value, therefore the OV-3 does not assist in scoring those measures. 
 Finally, the Random VDEA Score 1 Alternative has a VDEA-Score of 0.454.  This 
random alternative represents a system which is more lacking than the existing system.  This 
random alternative lacks many of the stronger valued measures and therefore scores lower.  This 
alternative shows a contrast to the baseline in which many of the values did not earn their full 
values. 
 The scores and difference from the current system for all alternatives can be found in 
Table 4.7.  This table illustrates exactly how much effect improvements to the current 
architecture will have on the total score.  For example, the addition of an SV-7 can cause a 
maximum change of 0.125 value units to the system.  Therefore, adding this one product has the 
highest impact on the system.  Adding an SV-7, SV-5, and completing the AV-1 will have a 
maximum change of 0.166 value units.  But making this change will require the addition of two 
products and alterations to an existing product.  Therefore, the most cost effective value adding 
measure will be to add an SV-7. 
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Table 4.7 Alternative Scores and Maximum Value Additions 
Alternative Name Score 
Maximum 
Value Change 
JFPASS Perfect System .890 0.352 
Baseline plus SV-7, SV-8, and SV-9 .709 0.171 
Baseline plus AV-1, SV-7, and SV-5 .704 0.166 
Random VDEA Score 4 .686 0.148 
Baseline plus SV-7 .663 0.125 
Random VDEA Score 3 .583 0.045 
Baseline plus AV-1 and SV-5 .578 0.040 
Baseline plus SV-8 .565 0.027 
Baseline plus SV-9 .557 0.019 
Random VDEA Score 2 .540 0.002 
Baseline .538 0.000 
Baseline plus full AV-1 .538 0.000 
Baseline plus OV-3 .538 0.000 
Baseline plus SV-5 .538 0.000 
Random VDEA Score 1 .454 -0.084 
 
 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 The Hierarchy Builder© software includes a sensitivity analysis tool which examines the 
weight of each value and measure in the hierarchy.  This sensitivity analysis tool allows the user 
to see how the VDEA score would be changed by adjusting the weight of a particular value or 
measure.  By examining how weights affect the scoring of alternatives, the decision-maker can 
gain insight as to how the weighting of a certain value affects the decision. 
4.3.1 Global Weight Sensitivity Analysis 
 The Hierarchy Builder© software’s sensitivity analysis tool is capable of performing 
sensitivity analyses both globally and locally.  This sensitivity analysis shows the decision maker 
how the final decision may be affected by altering the weight of a particular value.  Since the 
weights were chosen and validated by the decision-maker, the current weights are assumed 
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correct.  Sensitivity analysis is provided to demonstrate alternative scenarios and allow for 
further verification of weight.   
4.3.1.1 Alternative Sensitivity Analysis 
 Sensitivity analysis in a multiple alternative situation is generally more useful to the 
decision-maker.  In a multiple alternative situation, adjusting the weights of certain values or 
measures may lead to one alternative being chosen over another.  In some cases, a small change 
in weight may lead to a major change in the ranking of alternatives.  It is therefore important to 
closely examine the sensitivity curves for each of the alternatives to ensure that the weighting is 
correct and the proper alternative is being selected.  In the case of the JFPASS, the alteration of 
some weights may affect which product should be included next in the architecture.  With more 
alternatives, the complexity of the analysis and decision increases, and minor alterations may 
have a larger effect on the outcome.  Any changes to weights must be well vetted through the 
decision-maker to ensure the change is being made for the proper reasons. 
4.3.1.1.1 Alternatives System Effectiveness Sensitivity Analysis 
 When a sensitivity analysis is performed on all alternatives, the best performing system 
is, quite obviously, the Perfect system alternative.  This provides a good point of comparison for 
the other alternatives.  The analysis shows that if the local weight of System Effectiveness is 
increased to one, the perfect system is by far the best performing alternative; this is followed by 
the SV-7, SV-8, and SV-9 alternative.  The next best performing alternative is the Current 
system plus AV-1, SV-7, and SV-5 included.  Though this is the next best performing 
alternative, there is still a great deal of value not being earned.  Each of the alternatives has a 
negative slope as the weight of System Effectiveness approaches one.  This chart shows the 
decision maker that even in the case of the best generated alternative, there are value gaps.  In 
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addition, if the global weight of System Effectiveness is altered between zero and one, there will 
be no effect to the alternative preference.  Figure 4.7 shows the sensitivity analysis for System 
Effectiveness with all alternatives included. 
  
Figure 4.7  System Effectiveness Alternative Sensitivity Analysis 
4.3.1.1.2 Alternatives Capability Sensitivity Analysis 
 When the Capability value is examined, there are significant changes to the alternative 
ranking that can be affected by changing the weight of the Capability value.  The Perfect system 
will of course continue to perform the best of all alternatives as the weight increases.  As the 
global weight of Capability approaches approximately 0.4, the Random VDEA Score 4 
alternative begins to outperform the AV-1, SV-7, and SV-5 scenario.  As the global weight of 
Capability increases or decreases, it may affect the decision that will be made.  Depending on the 
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alternative chosen, the amount of adjustment before the decision is impacted alters.  In the case 
of Capability, if the weight is incorrect, it will not change the decision from this point.  These 
rankings, as well as the points at which the alternatives change order can be seen in Figure 4.8.  
If the weight is set to any value between zero and one, a new ranking can be found by observing 
the order of alternatives.  Locally, there are similar changes to the rankings of alternatives when 
examined.   
 
Figure 4.8  Capability Alternative Global Sensitivity Analysis 
 
4.3.1.1.3 Alternatives Maintainability Sensitivity Analysis 
 As the global weight of Maintainability increases, the ranking of alternatives changes 
significantly.  Several alternatives’ values drop to below 0.1 in fact.  The range of alternative 
scores varies between 0.05 and 0.82 (without consideration of the Perfect System).  Capability 
however only varies between 0.4 and 0.78.  This shows that the current scoring of 
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Maintainability offers a great deal of opportunities for improvement.  It is also evident that in 
some alternatives, particularly in the mid 0.6 value range, the decision is very sensitive to the 
weighting of Maintainability.  The alternatives in which the Maintainability measures have 
attained their maximum value perform much better in a Maintainability sensitivity analysis.  The 
random alternatives are the only alternatives that score differently than the generated 
alternatives.  All other generated alternative either rank in the lower or higher group, due to the 
effect of the Maintainability measures.  The generated alternatives generally perform together, 
since the addition of the SV-7 product allows all Maintainability measures to maximize.  The 
random alternatives are not bound by all Maintainability measures performing together; 
therefore, they score differently.  Locally, the alternatives perform similarly to globally, but the 
range of values decreases.  Figure 4.9 shows the global sensitivity analysis for Maintainability. 
 
Figure 4.9 Maintainability Alternative Global Sensitivity Analysis 
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4.3.1.1.4 Alternatives Interoperability Sensitivity Analysis 
 The sensitivity analysis for Interoperability shows that again the random alternatives are 
the only one that performs significantly differently.  All other alternatives converge to the same 
value of approximately 0.6 as their global weights approach one.  As the weights approach zero, 
their values diverge slightly from their current state, but the rankings do not change.  This 
implies that in order to affect any significant change to the final score, the Interoperability 
measures must score differently than they do in the majority of the alternatives.  In this case, the 
weight of Interoperability can have a major effect on the decision.  If the weight of 
Interoperability is increased to 0.5, the SV-5 is the next best choice.  Until that point, the 
decision remains unaltered.  In an analysis of the scoring of each alternative, it is apparent that 
each of the random alternatives has differing scores for the Interoperability measures, causing 
their changes in the sensitivity analysis.  Figure 4.10 shows the global sensitivity analysis for the 
Interoperability value.   
 
Figure 4.10 Interoperability Alternative Global Sensitivity Analysis  
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Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 This chapter provides an overview of the research completed and the results of the 
JFPASS system analysis.  The research questions for this effort were answered by leveraging the 
Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) process.  Recommendations for the existing architecture as well 
as future architecture developments in the Joint Force Protection Advance Security System 
(JFPASS) project were also determined. In addition, suggestions for improvement of the Value-
Driven Enterprise Architecture (VDEA) tool are discussed. 
5.1 Evaluation Result 
 The research questions for this effort were “(1)  Can the VFT process be applied to an 
evaluation of a set of architectural products?  (2)  What is the resulting Hierarchy to evaluate a 
force protection system?  (3)  What are the related weights and measures for the hierarchy?  (4) 
What score does the provided architecture score based on this hierarchy and where are the 
shortfalls and potential areas of improvement?”  Each of these questions were answered during 
this effort. 
 It was shown that the VFT process could be applied to evaluate a set of architectural 
products.  Through research into existing guidance and documentation and interviews with 
decision-makers, it is possible to determine what values are important to those decision-makers 
in architectural design.  Through the use of the VFT process, a Value-Driven Enterprise 
Architecture methodology was found.  Even with a single alternative, the VFT process was able 
to output a score for the system as a whole to be used as a baseline for future improvements.  In 
addition to giving the decision-maker a baseline, the VFT process allowed for the creation of 
alternatives that could show the possible future maturation and development of the project.  
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These alternatives gave the decision-maker a set of comparison criteria to determine the future 
direction of project development. 
 The resulting hierarchy for JFPASS evaluation was developed in two major branches: the 
System Effectiveness Branch and the Architecture Quality branch.  This effort determined a 
possible hierarchy for System Effectiveness evaluation.  This Hierarchy is shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 System Effectiveness Hierarchy 
 
 In addition to the hierarchy, weights were assigned to each value and measures of 
effectiveness assigned to each lowest tier value.  The weights assigned to each value were 
determined through both research of the guidance and documentation and interviews with subject 
matter experts (SMEs) in the field of force protection (FP).  The resulting 16 measures allow the 
decision-maker to determine the effectiveness of the system in question.   
 Finally, the JFPASS was assigned a score of 0.538 of 1.000 possible value units through 
a deterministic analysis.  This score includes the value earned by both the System Effectiveness 
and the Architecture Quality.  This is also an “earned value” as opposed to a final score.  At this 
point in time, the JFPASS has earned 0.538 of its possible value units.  As it is still early in its 
development, there is time to earn additional value for this system and improve the score.  This 
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score also serves to show the level of development of the current system, as well as which areas 
are lacking.  The shortfalls and suggested areas of improvement are presented in the next section. 
5.2 Recommendations 
 Through deterministic analysis and sensitivity analysis of the system, several 
recommendations were generated, both for improvement of the current system and for future 
development of the system.  These recommendations are intended to help guide work on the 
JFPASS project with the final system value in mind.  Final determination of the course of future 
system development lies in the hands of the decision-maker and system sponsor, but the scores 
and sensitivity analysis provide a justification for possible changes to system development. 
5.2.1 Future View Development 
 Several areas of evaluation in System Effectiveness require more information or 
additional views to properly score.  The addition of these views would allow for the scoring of 
certain measures of effectiveness, providing more value to the overall system.  Through a 
sensitivity analysis of the current measures, it was possible to determine the maximum benefit 
provided by each measure and view.  Table 5.1 shows the maximum benefit that the creation of 
each new view would have on the total score.   
 The JFPASS Perfect System alternative exists for decision-maker comparison, not as a 
practical alternative.  The highest scoring realistic alternative is one which incorporates a 
complete SV-7, SV-8, and SV-9.  The next alternative in the ranking requires three additional 
views, each of which builds on the information in others.  By creating these additional views in a 
specific order, value can be added more quickly.  For these recommendations, the random 
alternatives are not considered.  They are included in the analysis as a basis of comparison for 
the decision-maker.  These recommendations may be applied to cost-benefit analysis.   
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Table 5.1 Maximum Value Benefit of New Views 
Alternative Name Score 
Maximum Value 
Benefit 
JFPASS Perfect System 0.890 0.352 
Current System plus AV-1, SV-7, and SV-5 0.704 0.166 
JFPASS Random 4 0.686 0.0148 
Current System plus SV-7 0.663 0.0125 
JFPASS Random 3 0.583 0.045 
Current System plus AV-1 and SV-5 0.578 0.040 
Current System plus SV-8 0.565 0.027 
Current System plus SV-9 0.557 0.019 
JFPASS Random 2 0.540 0.002 
Baseline 0.538 0.000 
Current System plus Full AV-1 0.538 0.000 
Current System plus OV-3 0.538 0.000 
Current System plus SV-5 0.538 0.000 
JFPASS Random 1 0.454 -0.084 
 
 Based on this analysis, the next most beneficial product to create would be the SV-7, 
System Performance Parameters Matrix.  This view allows the architect to add information 
regarding the parameters to which system components are designed.  This includes three of the 
four Maintainability measures required for this evaluation.  The information contained in the  
SV-7 product may already be used in the system design, but without the SV-7, there is no other 
place in the architecture that the information can be found.  For the system to be properly 
designed, it must have some parameters by which system components are designed, specifically 
regarding their supportability, reliability, and recoverability.  These ideas must simply be 
included in the architecture to ensure compliance with the parameters and proper representation 
to the reader.  By simply adding the SV-7 product, the total system score has the potential to 
increase by 0.125 value units (if all required information is included). 
 Following the creation of the SV-7, an SV-5, Operational Activity to Systems Function 
view would create the next highest value benefit.  The SV-5 is intended to show the reader which 
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components are accomplishing which functions.  By tracing those functions up to operational 
requirements, it is possible to determine how the operational needs of the system are being met, 
i.e. using which system components.  For the SV-5 to be of any benefit, though, the AV-1 must 
also be updated with an explicit list of the operational requirements for the system.  The AV-1 
currently includes a discussion of the purpose of the system, but lacks any specific discussion of 
the problems that the system will solve and the constraints by which the system is being 
designed.  It was of great importance to the decision-maker that the system accomplishes its 
goals.  Therefore, those goals must be outlined explicitly.  The AV-1 provides the best context 
for this discussion.  These details may also be included in some appendix to the architecture, but 
should be included with the architectural package.  Without a list of operational needs or 
requirements, the SV-5 is of no benefit to the system.  If the SV-5/AV-1 update is completed 
following the creation of the SV-7, the three updates have a positive cumulative effect on the 
system score.  They will cause a positive change of 0.166 value units to the final score.   
 The next most beneficial view would be the SV-8, Systems Evolution Description.  The 
inclusion of the SV-8 allows the architecture evaluator the ability to score the ADAPTION 
measure.  There are currently no details included in the architecture regarding the Flexibility of 
the system.  The SV-8 has the ability to show the reader how the system may evolve not only 
further into the acquisition and design process, but under operational constraints.  The inclusion 
of an SV-8 with the necessary information to score Adaptability may cause a benefit of 0.027 
value units.   
 Finally, the SV-9, Systems Technology Forecast view would provide the next most 
benefit to the system score.  The inclusion of the SV-9 has the ability to add 1.9 value units to the 
total score.  The SV-9 product allows the reader to determine the current Technology Readiness 
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Level (TRL) of the components included in the architecture.  The TRL of each component is 
required to determine the overall system TRL for the TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY measure.   
 The OV-3, while included as supporting documentation for some measures, is not 
required for this system.  It is possible to determine the information included in the OV-3 
without its inclusion for scoring.  The OV-3 may include other information of use to the architect 
or decision-maker, therefore its inclusion should not be complete discounted.  The architect is 
also bound by the milestone decision point requirements for architecture products.  In other force 
protection systems, this view may be required to score the architecture.  The addition of an SV-5 
alone will not add any value either, unless it is added with the AV-1 updates.  Conversely, the 
addition of a complete AV-1 will not have any positive effect on the system score without the 
SV-5. 
5.2.2 System Strengthening 
 In addition to future development of views, several steps may be taken to strengthen the 
current system and its score.  In some cases, more value may be earned by improving upon 
information already included or updating design decisions based on the decision-maker’s most 
important values.  In other cases, a measure may already score full value, but the inclusion of 
additional information may make the architecture more easily scored and read.   
 The THREAT DETECTION, THREAT ASSESSMENT and WARNING PLAN measures were all 
scored positively.  Though they were scored at their highest level, it is possible to make them 
more easily accessible to architecture readers.  Each of these measures refers to the inclusion of a 
plan related to the measure.  To determine the degree of attainment of these measures, the OV-5 
product was used.  Since the activities required to accomplish each of these concepts were 
included, they were scored positively.  Including actual text versions of the plans may assist not 
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only the architecture readers, but also future users of the architecture.  Each installation is 
required, regardless of service component to have official, written plans for these concepts.  The 
inclusion of skeleton versions of these plans in the architecture would assist in the scoring and 
ensure compliance of each installation. 
 The ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT measure was scored “CONUS and Contingency 
constratints.”  This measure is capable of earning 0.2 additional value units by adding Host 
Nation constraints to the current consideration.  Including international environmental policy 
documents in the   TV-1 would allow this measure to be scored  at a higher level.  It may also be 
possible to include the environmental policies of several nations that the U.S. military 
historically operates and has standing military commitments (or Status of Forces Agreements 
(SOFA)) with.   
  The MONETARY PRACTICALITY measures refer to the budgetary constraints that all 
government programs are subject to.  The ability to construct a system within budget is of major 
concern to all stakeholders in a project.  The inclusion of specific cost information to the 
architecture would not only allow the scoring of these measures, but would add verification to 
the stakeholders of a system’s fiscal viability.  A total system estimate and program budget must 
of course be included as well in order to compare the cost information to.  The OV-5 product has 
the ability to display this information.  Initial cost and life cycle costs may also be included in the 
AV-1 product, although the costs would not be itemized by component. 
 The two Net-Centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI) measures also have 
room for improvement.  Currently, the NESI DEVELOPMENT measure is scored positively, but its 
assessment may be improved by explicitly including the NESI documents in the TV-1.  The 
assessment for this measure was done by comparing the included system design and design 
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documents to the NESI guidance and determining that the system was being constructed with 
Net-Centricity in mind.  Including the NESI documents in the architecture would show the 
architecture reader that the system was in fact designed with these concepts in mind.  In addition 
to including the Net-Centricity documents, a NESI evaluation should also be completed on the 
architecture.  Simply completing the evaluation would allow for a positive score of the NESI 
EVALUATION measure, but inclusion of the evaluation in the architecture, as well as a positive 
score would assist in the scoring of the architecture. 
5.3 Model Strengths 
 The creation of the Value Driven Enterprise Architecture tool allows a force protection 
architecture to be objectively evaluated.  This tool gives the decision-maker an objective 
numerical score from which to base future revisions and additions to the architecture.  This 
baseline combined with analysis of the score shows the most beneficial views to be created in the 
future and improvements that may be made to the existing architecture.   
 In interviews with several force protection experts, the system was found to be all 
inclusive of the important values for force protection.  Each of the SMEs found no major areas of 
force protection that were not included in the values of this model.  By creating a system built 
around the values alone, a comprehensive force protection system may be constructed.   
 This model allows a project stakeholder or sponsor to “score” a system based solely on 
its architecture.  This is useful since many acquisition decisions are made based solely on 
architectural products.  Having a tool to evaluate them allow for objective evaluation of the 
architecture. 
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5.4 Model Weaknesses 
 While the model is useful for the decision-maker, there are limitations and several areas 
that may be improved.  The extensibility of the measures under the System Effectiveness branch 
may be limited.  The measures as presented here were useful for a force protection system in the 
very early stages of development.  As the system matures, new measures will need to be created 
to keep up with the changing needs of the system.  At some point, it may be necessary to 
improve the granularity and objectivity of measures to better evaluate increased complexity. 
 Another weakness of this model is associated with the inherent uncertainty of a VFT 
model.  The Single Dimension Value Functions (SDVFs) and weights are based on input from 
the decision-maker and subject matter experts.  They were constructed to match the values of the 
people involved in their construction, but in the end these instruments are only the opinion of 
those who were involved in their creation.  There are other possible combinations of weights and 
SDVFs which may also measure the system.   
 There remains a certain level of ambiguity and subjectivity involved in the scoring of the 
architecture.  Though the scores were reached by consensus and taken directly from the 
architectural products, some scores may not be accurate.  The descriptions included in Chapter 3 
allow for repeatability, but some subjective decisions must still be made regarding the scores. 
5.5 Future Research 
 This effort has opened the door for several additional areas of research.  The research 
may be extended to refine values, measures, and SDVFs and update the hierarchy to include 
future assessments of the same system.  The value hierarchy derived in this study may be applied 
to other force protection systems.  Individual projects outside the scope of JFPASS may also use 
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the methodology to objectively score their viability.  Component selection may also be 
influenced by the value hierarchy or the VDEA score. 
 The JFPASS system is currently in an early stage of development and will continue to 
mature.  As the project grows, some measures may be revised to reflect the updated system.  
Several measures currently determine the existence of certain concepts, but in the future, they 
may be used to measure quality of the achievement of these values.   
 The hierarchy derived in this study includes all of the major values associated with any 
force protection system and perhaps different types of systems.  The hierarchy may be applied to 
FP systems outside the JFPASS to complete similar evaluations.  It may also be used to design 
future FP systems in order to ensure their compliance with the most important aspects of the 
force protection. 
 The JFPASS system will have several individual projects created under its “umbrella.”  
As they projects emerge, they may also be scored using the same model.  The System 
Effectiveness branch will allow for the evaluation of any force protection system, particularly 
those within the purview of JFPASS.  Outside the context of JFPASS, other Force protection 
projects may also be compared using this architecture.  As projects are submitted to the JFPASS 
office, they may be compared using this architecture.  The hierarchy allows for project selection 
from a number of alternatives in addition to its ability to generate new alternatives. 
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Appendix A.  Ilities Master List 
 
accessibility evolvability repairability 
accountability extensibility repeatability 
accuracy feasibility reproducibility 
adaptability fidelity resiliency 
administrability flexibility responsiveness 
affordability functionality reusability 
agility installability robustness 
applicability interchangeability scalability 
auditability internationalizability seamlessness 
availability interoperability securability 
capability learnability security 
changeability maintainability serviceability 
communication manageability Simplicity 
compatibility mobility Stability 
complexity modifiability stakeholder involvement 
compliancy modularity subscribability 
composability nomadicity supportability 
configurability openness survivability 
consistency operability susceptability 
constructability performance sustainability 
controllability personalizability tailorability 
credibility portability testability 
customizability practicality timeliness 
data integrity precision traceability 
degradability predictability trainability 
demonstrability produceability transactionality 
dependability protectability understandability 
deployability purposefulness upgradeability 
diagnoseability quality usability 
distributability readability utility 
durability recoverability versatility 
effectiveness relevance vulnerability 
efficiency reliability 
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Appendix B.  System Effectiveness Groups and Synonyms 
Group 1:  Capability 
 Subgroup 1:  Purposefulness 
Synonyms:  Relevance, Applicability, Utility, Performance, Robustness, 
Functionality 
 Subgroup 2:  Practicality 
Synonyms:  Deployability, Affordability, Produceability, Constructability, 
Efficiency, Feasibility, Installability, Operability 
 Subgroup 3:  Flexibility 
Synonyms:  Modularity, Responsiveness, Configurability, Versatility, 
Adaptability, Mobility, Agility 
Group 2:  Maintainability 
 Subgroup 1:  Dependability 
  Subgroup 1.1:  Supportability 
   Synonyms:  Repairability, Sustainability, Serviceability, Maintainability 
  Subgroup 1.2:  Reliability 
   Synonyms:  Dependability, Degradability, Fidelity, Stability 
 Subgroup 2:  Resiliency 
  Subgroup 2.1:  Survivability 
   Synonyms:  Susceptibility 
  Subgroup 2.2:  Recoverability 
   Synonyms:  Diagnosability 
Group 3:  Interoperability 
 Subgroup 1:  Communication 
 Subgroup 2:  Interchangeability 
  Synonyms:  Compatibility, Internationalizability 
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Appendix C.  Supplemental Deterministic Analysis Charts 
 
Figure C.1 JFPASS Score Fundamental Objective - Measures 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.538
NESI Development NESI Evaluation
Reliability Requirements Operational Needs
Threat Detection Threat Assessment
Warning Plan Redundancy
Supportability Requirements Access Control
Document Protection Joint Operations
DoDAF Compliancy OV Readability
SV Readability Adaptation
Recoverability Requirements Scale
Decomposition Access
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Figure C.2 JFPASS Score Fundamental Objective - Values 
 
 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.538
System Effectiveness Architecture Quality
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Figure C.3 System Effectiveness Score - Measures 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.413
NESI Development NESI Evaluation
Reliability Requirements Operational Needs
Threat Detection Threat Assessment
Warning Plan Redundancy
Supportability Requirements Joint Operations
Adaptation Recoverability Requirements
Technological Availability Environmental Impact
Monetary Practicality - Initial Monetary Practicality - Maintenance
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Figure C.4 Capability Score - Measures 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.514
Operational Needs Threat Detection
Threat Assessment Warning Plan
Adaptation Technological Availability
Environmental Impact Monetary Practicality - Initial
Monetary Practicality - Maintenance
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Figure C.5 Capability Score - Values 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.514
Purposefulness Practicality Flexibility
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Figure C.6 Purposefulness Score - Measures 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.750
Operational Needs Threat Detection Threat Assessment Warning Plan
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Figure C.7 Practicality Score - Measures 
 
 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.213
Technological Availability Environmental Impact
Monetary Practicality - Initial Monetary Practicality - Maintenance
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Figure C.8 Maintainability Score - Measures 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.060
Reliability Requirements Redundancy Supportability Requirements Recoverability Requirements
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Figure C.9 Maintainability Score - Values 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.060
Dependability Resiliency
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Figure C.10 Interoperability Score - Measures 
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.600
NESI Development NESI Evaluation Joint Operations
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Figure C.11 Interoperability Score - Values 
 
  
JFPASS 17 February 2009    0.600
Communication Interchangeability
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Appendix D.  Alternative Scores 
Alternative Name:  Baseline 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 1 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 
ADAPTATION Static 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS No 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  JFPASS Perfect System 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 1 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 9 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS, Contingency, and Host Nation constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
INITIAL < 95% budget 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE < 95% budget 
ADAPTATION Minimal effort 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION Yes 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
REDUNDANCY All systems, multiple redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS Yes 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Current System plus SV-7 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 1 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 
ADAPTATION Static 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Current System plus Full AV-1 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 1 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 
ADAPTATION Static 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Current System plus OV-3 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 1 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 
ADAPTATION Static 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Current System plus SV-5 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 1 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 
ADAPTATION Static 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Current System plus SV-8 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 1 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 
ADAPTATION Minimal effort 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Current System plus SV-9 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 9 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 
ADAPTATION Static 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Current System plus AV-1 and SV-5 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 1 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 1 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 
ADAPTATION Static 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Random VDEA Score 1 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0.8 
THREAT DETECTION No 
THREAT ASSESSMENT No 
WARNING PLAN No 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 7 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL > 105% budget 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE > 105% budget 
ADAPTATION On-Site acceptable effort 
JOINT OPERATIONS No 
NESI DEVELOPMENT No 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, multiple redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Random VDEA Score 2 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0.01 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN No 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 4 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT Cannot be built 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL > 105% budget 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE > 105% budget 
ADAPTATION On-Site acceptable effort 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT No 
NESI EVALUATION Yes 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Random VDEA Score 3 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0.205 
THREAT DETECTION No 
THREAT ASSESSMENT No 
WARNING PLAN No 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 4 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Between 95% and 105% budget 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE > 105% budget 
ADAPTATION On-Site acceptable effort 
JOINT OPERATIONS No 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION Yes 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
REDUNDANCY All systems, multiple redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
  
  
  
171 
 
Alternative Name:  Random VDEA Score 4 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0.866 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 1 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS, Contingency, and Host Nation constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Between 95% and 105% budget 
ADAPTATION Minimal effort 
JOINT OPERATIONS No 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, multiple redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Current System plus AV-1, SV-7, and SV-5 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 1 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 1 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 
ADAPTATION Static 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS No 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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Alternative Name:  Current System plus SV-7, SV-8 and SV-9 
Measure Name Measurement 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS 0 
THREAT DETECTION Yes 
THREAT ASSESSMENT Yes 
WARNING PLAN Yes 
TECHNOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY TRL 9 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONUS and Contingency constraints 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - INITIAL Cost Unknown 
MONETARY PRACTICALITY - 
MAINTENANCE Cost unknown 
ADAPTATION Minimal Effort 
JOINT OPERATIONS Yes 
NESI DEVELOPMENT Yes 
NESI EVALUATION No 
ACCESS Access between 3 and 7 days 
PRODUCT LOCATABILITY Less than 5 min 
ACCESS CONTROL Appropriate protection implemented 
DOCUMENT PROTECTION Plan exists, all products controlled 
FILE MANAGEMENT No system 
FILE FORMAT General File Format 
SCALE Most views 
DECOMPOSITION 3+ Levels 
TOOL FORMAT All views 
DODAF COMPLIANCY 0.83 
REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 0 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY 0.83 
SME EFFECTIVENESS No Plan 
SME INVOLVEMENT No involvement 
SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
REDUNDANCY Some systems, single redundancy 
RECOVERABILITY REQUIREMENTS Yes 
CONNECTIONS 0.83 
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY Between 0 and 1:500 
ARCHITECTURE ECONOMY No 
OV READABILITY 0.8 
SV READABILITY 0.6 
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